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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Courts reviewing foreign judgments to determine whether they are
worthy of recognition have created an "international due process"
analysis. The analysis requires courts to pass judgment on the
overall judicial and political systems of the countries from which the
judgments originated and to determine whether the systems as a
whole are fundamentally fair. Remarkably, courts ignore the
individual proceedings that resulted in the judgment and refuse to
determine whether the foreign courts afforded the individual
litigants due process, relying instead on political "evidence" and
judges'own personal perceptions of the foreign countries. Courts have
gone so far as to label countries "civilized" and "uncivilized. " Under
this analysis, courts will enforce judgments from "civilized" nations
that violate U.S. constitutional norms and refuse to enforce judg-
ments from "uncivilized" countries even if the foreign countries
afforded the litigants due process. This Article argues that the
international due process analysis violates the separation of powers
because it requires courts to make foreign policy. This Article also re-
envisions an international due process analysis that would require
courts to assess--according to American notions of due process-the
particular foreign proceedings in which judgments sought to be
recognized and enforced were rendered.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's reliance in Roper v. Simmons1 and
Lawrence v. Texas2  on foreign precedent to interpret the
Constitution sparked a firestorm of criticism.' It spawned a rich
debate among scholars regarding the extent to which U.S. courts
should defer to foreign law when developing U.S. constitutional
norms.' But a larger issue is the extent to which globalization,
which is increasing at exponential rates, should influence domestic
legal principles. Not only are American consumers and businesses
becoming more global in their perspectives, but judges are as well.
This Article looks at a subset of the issue of deference to foreign law
and international influences in judicial decision making: the extent
to which courts should apply American notions of due process in
determining whether to recognize and enforce judgments obtained
abroad.
Blind deference to foreign courts is becoming the norm in the area
of foreign judgment recognition. In Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden,
Judge Richard Posner found that foreign judgments from the United
Kingdom need not comport with American notions of due process to
be enforced in the United States.5 Instead, Judge Posner held that
1. 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
2. 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
3. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Editorial, Judicial Tourism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2005,
at A14; The Insidious Wiles of Foreign Influence, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2005, at 25; Dana
Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A3.
Some members of Congress have also criticized the Court for its reliance on foreign law and
even introduced a bill to prohibit reference to foreign law in constitutional cases. See The
Insidious Wiles of Foreign Influence, supra, at 26 (noting that Republicans introduced the bill
and that it is "almost certainly a violation of the separation of powers").
4. For example, the November 2005 issue of the Harvard Law Review was devoted to this
issue. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistence,
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004
Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign
Law and the Modern lus Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129 (2005); Ernest A. Young, Foreign
Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005); see also Roger P. Alford,
Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2005);
David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2005); Melissa A. Waters,
Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and
Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487 (2005).
5. 233 F.3d 473, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2000).
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foreign judgments from the United Kingdom and other "civilized"
countries need only comply with a much looser standard:
We'll call this the "international concept of due process" to
distinguish it from the complex concept that has emerged from
American case law. We note that it is even less demanding than
the test the courts use to determine whether to enforce a foreign
arbitral award under the New York Convention....'
Under Judge Posner's analysis, the fact that a foreign court denied
a judgment debtor due process is inconsequential. The only issue is
whether, in the court's view, the foreign country, as a general
matter, has a fair judicial system.7 If the court feels that the country
has a fair judicial system, it can, in the name of comity, enforce the
judgment against the judgment debtor. On the other hand, had the
judgment creditor obtained the judgment in a country that the court
feels has unjust and "uncivilized" judicial and political systems, the
court will completely disregard the judgment.8 This analysis, under
which courts divide judicial systems of the world into the "civilized"
and the "uncivilized," is what Judge Posner dubbed international
due process.
Judge Posner is not alone in his conclusion that American
standards of due process do not apply to foreign judgments. In
recent years, courts have ignored the due process mandates of the
U.S. Constitution in an effort to promote liberal foreign judgment
recognition rules.9 This Article argues that the international due
6. Id. at 477.
7. Several courts have found that the entire legal system in the foreign country had to
be unfair or lacking in due process to preclude recognition of a foreign judgment. For example,
the Fifth Circuit has observed "that the Texas Recognition Act requires that the foreign
judgment be 'rendered [only] under a system' that provides impartial tribunals and procedures
compatible with 'due process of law."' Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir.
2002) (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE §
36.005(a)(1) (Vernon 1985)); see also Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477 (emphasizing that the
"system" must be unfair to preclude recognition, and expressing doubt as to the viability of
the "retail approach," which focuses on the particular proceedings). Furthermore, courts
require only that the foreign procedures be compatible with due process. Turner, 303 F.3d at
330 ("mhe foreign proceedings need not comply with the traditional rigors of American due
process to meet the requirements of enforceability under the statute."). But the proceedings
must be "fundamentally fair." Id.
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. See generally Mathias Reimann, Parochialism in American Conflicts Law, 49 AM. J.
2007] 1163
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process analysis violates the separation of powers because it
requires judges to make foreign policy. Moreover, this Article re-
envisions an international due process analysis of foreign judgments
that considers the particulars of the foreign proceedings that
produced the judgment sought to be enforced. This approach is not
only more desirable than the current international due process
analysis, but it is also constitutionally mandatory under the state
action doctrine.' ° U.S. courts are not at liberty to recognize foreign
judgments that are unconstitutional.
Part I briefly discusses foreign judgment recognition generally.
It then looks at the international due process cases in depth.
Specifically, it focuses on cases in which courts have condemned a
country's entire judicial and political system and found its judg-
ments unworthy of recognition. In these cases, the courts ignored
the individual proceedings from which the judgments originated and
refused to determine whether the foreign courts afforded the
individual litigants due process. The courts relied instead on
political "evidence" and judges' own personal perceptions of the
foreign countries. Part I also focuses on Ashenden and other Lloyd's
of London cases that are based on the same facts and follow Judge
Posner's international due process analysis. In the Lloyd's cases,
courts across the country labeled the British judicial system fair as
a matter of law despite strong arguments that the British courts
denied individual debtors due process in their particular cases.11
Part II argues that the international due process analysis violates
the separation of powers. It draws on principles underlying the
political question doctrine, 2 which is rooted in separation of powers
principles. Courts lack the institutional competence to undertake
the international due process analysis. Should courts continue to
apply this analysis, there will be an increasing potential to embar-
rass the executive branch in its foreign relations efforts. Though
foreign judgment recognition cases are most often decided by federal
courts sitting in diversity, this Part specifically addresses the
COMP. L. 369 (2001).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 480-83 for an explanation of the state action
doctrine.
11. See infra Part I.C.
12. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-49 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
208-37 (1962).
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problem with state courts applying the international due process
analysis. Like federal courts, state courts cannot make foreign
policy. The Supreme Court has struck down a state statute that
requires an analysis almost identical to the international due
process analysis, finding that it violated the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine.13 This doctrine is also rooted in separation of powers
principles.
Part III offers a solution for reshaping the due process review of
foreign judgments. Under this solution, courts cannot pass judgment
on the judicial and political systems of the countries in which the
judgments were rendered. If there are countries whose judgments
the executive branch deems unworthy of recognition, then it can
compile an official list, much like the terrorist country list it
maintains. If, however, the executive branch has not officially stated
that a particular country's judgments are not to be recognized, then
courts must consider whether the foreign country afforded the
litigants due process in the individual foreign proceedings. This
Article argues that, under the state action doctrine, courts must
assess the individual proceedings, applying American notions of due
process. This is the approach that courts have taken when faced
with judgments that would violate the First Amendment's free
speech guarantees. 4 My solution eliminates the separation of
powers problems with the international due process analysis. It also
recognizes that courts cannot enforce judgments obtained in
violation of due process.
I. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF DUE PROCESS
This Part looks in depth at the international due process cases.
The courts in these cases interpreted the due process provisions
of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Act and the Third
Restatement of Foreign Relations, which are identical, as only
requiring that the entire legal system in the foreign country be
unfair or lacking in due process guarantees to preclude the recogni-
tion of a foreign judgment. It is insufficient merely to argue that the
13. See infra notes 204-14.
14. See infra Part III.C.1 for an example of this approach, the "international free speech"
cases.
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individual proceedings in the foreign court were unfair. An analysis
of these cases reveals that there was no type of due process analysis,
international or domestic. The courts in these cases, instead of
engaging in a due process analysis, engaged actively in interna-
tional politics. Their opinions are replete with political commentar-
ies on the countries from which the foreign judgments came.
Before turning to the international due process cases, however,
this Part will discuss briefly the general scheme in the United
States for the recognition of foreign judgments, which is based on
the loosely-defined doctrine of comity. As this brief history will
demonstrate, the politicization of foreign judgment recognition
began long before the international due process cases.
A. Foreign Judgment Recognition Generally
The U.S. Constitution does not deal with judgments obtained in
other countries. Unlike with sister state judgments, there is no full
faith and credit for foreign judgments.15 In 1895, the Supreme Court
decided the landmark case of Hilton v. Guyot,'6 which laid the
foundation for modern foreign judgment recognition law. Hilton
involved a French liquidator's attempt to collect on a judgment
obtained in France against an American citizen. 7 In a 5-4 decision,
the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the judgment debtor, Hilton,
and refused to recognize the French judgment. 8 The Court began its
analysis with a discussion of the comity doctrine. 9 The Court made
its now well-known statement regarding the principle of comity:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows
15. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State; And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.").
16. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
17. Id. at 114.
18. Id. at 227-28 (stating that foreign judgments should be viewed as prima facie, rather
than conclusive, evidence because that is how they were considered at the time of the
Constitution's adoption).
19. Id. at 163-64.
1166 [Vol. 48:1159
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within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.2 °
The Court painstakingly reviewed the treatment of foreign judg-
ments in other countries, particularly Great Britain,2 and then
announced its rule regarding the conclusiveness of foreign judg-
ments:
[W]e are satisfied that, where there has been opportunity for a
full and fair trial abroad before a [foreign] court of competent
jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after
due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and
under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice between the citizens of its own country
and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either
prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it
was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other
special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it
full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an action brought
in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new
trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the
judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.22
Though the French judgment seemed to meet these requirements,
the Court nevertheless refused to recognize the judgment because
France did not at that time recognize American judgments.23 In
other words, the Court refused to recognize the judgment because
there was no reciprocity.24
Hilton's comity-based rules for recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments survive today, though most states reject its re-
20. Id. at 163-64. Scholars have noted that the definition of comity is illusive and has
often been the source of confusion. As an example, see generally Louise Weinberg, Against
Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53 (1991).
21. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 171.
22. Id. at 202-03.
23. Id. at 227-28.
24. Note that the Court did not include reciprocity in its definition of comity. See Joel R.
Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 9 (1991) (observing the lack of a
reciprocity requirement in Hilton's definition of comity and finding unresolved the question
of "whether comity is conditioned on reciprocal treatment or is discretionary").
20071 1167
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ciprocity requirement.2 The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act (Uniform Act)2" in 1962, and the
American Bar Association approved it the same year.27 Since 1962,
a majority of states have adopted the Uniform Act.28 States that
have not adopted the Uniform Act rely on common law rules and
principles and the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
(Restatement), which are based on Hilton.29 In fact, the Uniform Act
codified "rules that ha[d] long been applied by the majority of courts
in [the United States]," and which were based on Hilton.3 °
Under the Restatement and the Uniform Act, if a party obtains
a judgment outside the United States but wishes to collect on it in
the United States, that party must have the judgment "recognized"
and then enforced.3 Courts will enforce a judgment unless the
25. See Mata v. Am. Life Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1375, 1382 & n.15 (D. Del. 1991) (noting
that few states require reciprocity). After Hilton, state courts continued to develop their own
rules for recognizing foreign judgments. State courts did not consider Hilton's reciprocity
requirement binding because the ruling was from a federal court. For example, in Johnston
v. Compagnie Gndrale Transatlantique, the New York Court of Appeals recognized a French
judgment. 152 N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y. 1926).
26. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (1962), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/ufmjra62.htm.
27. See Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 2d 905,911-13 (N.D. Iowa 2002)
(detailing the history of the Uniform Act).
28. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL),
Legislative Fact Sheet, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-
ufmjra.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2007). The states that have adopted the Uniform Act are
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Id. The District of Columbia and the U.S.
Virgin Islands have also adopted the Act. Id.
29. See In re Breau, 565 A.2d 1044, 1049 (N.H. 1989) (referencing the common law
principles of Hilton v. Guyot, as well as section 481 of the Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law, adopted in 1987). For an overview of state law standards for enforcement and
recognition of foreign judgments, as well as a chart comparing factors considered in Hilton
and the Uniform Act, see Cedric C. Chao & Christine S. Neuhoff, Enforcement and
Recognition of Foreign Judgments in United States Courts: A Practical Perspective, 29 PEPP.
L. REV. 147 (2001).
30. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, prefatory note (1962).
31. The Uniform Act applies to "any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying
recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a
judgment for support in matrimonial or family matters." Id. § 1(2). Therefore, tax judgments
and family law judgments, such as for child support and alimony, are specifically excluded
from the Uniform Act. Additionally, the Uniform Act applies only to judgments that are "final
[Vol. 48:11591168
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judgment debtor establishes the applicability of one of the statutory
grounds for nonrecognition. Some of those grounds are mandatory
exceptions, and some are discretionary. Under the Restatement
and the Uniform Act, the section dealing with the mandatory
grounds for nonrecognition provides that "[a] foreign judgment is
not conclusive if ... the judgment was rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
with the requirements of due process of law."33 This provision has
become the basis for the so-called international due process
exception to foreign judgment recognition.
and conclusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending
or it is subject to appeal." Id. § 2. The court in which recognition and enforcement are sought
may, however, stay its proceedings until the appeal has been determined or until the time
period in which the defendant may appeal has expired. Id.
32. NCCUSL recently revised the Uniform Act, renaming it the UNIFORM FOREIGN-
COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (2005), available at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/blllulc/ufmjra/2005final.htm. See infra notes 438-44. At this time, no state has adopted
the revised Uniform Act. See http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/ uniform
acts-fs-ufcmjra.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2007). Part III will discuss the revised Act's failure
to deal with the international due process problem. NCCUSL did not modify the provision on
which the international due process is based. Though some states have made variations, such
as adding a reciprocity requirement, the version of the Uniform Act that is still in effect in
thirty states specifically asserts that
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial
tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, § 4(a) (1962). The Uniform Act
further provides for discretionary grounds for nonrecognition:
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of the
proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the
parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by
proceedings in that court; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was
a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
Id. § 4(b) (emphasis added).
33. Id. § 4(a). The Restatement and the Uniform Act also contain notice provisions. Id.
§ 4(b)(1).
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Courts today emphasize that the Uniform Act and the
Restatement require that the foreign judgment be 'rendered [only]
under a system' that provides impartial tribunals and procedures
compatible with 'due process of law."'34 Furthermore, courts note
that the Uniform Act requires only that the foreign procedures be
compatible with due process.35 As many courts have found, "the
foreign proceedings need not comply with the traditional rigors of
American due process to meet the requirements of enforceability
under the statute," but the proceedings must be fundamentally
fair.36
B. "Bad Country" Cases: Pahlavi and Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank
It seems difficult to show that an entire country's judicial system
is so flawed and so lacking in fundamental fairness that no judg-
ment obtained under that system is worthy of recognition. But
despite this high standard, and the seeming difficulty of proof, there
have been cases involving such allegations of "serious injustice," in
which courts have found that as a matter of law the country from
which the judgment was obtained failed to provide due process.
These judgments were from courts in Iran and Liberia, respectively.
1. Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi
In Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, the Ninth Circuit refused to
recognize an Iranian judgment.37 The court rendered its decision in
June 1995, not long after President Clinton imposed tough economic
sanctions on Iran.3" In Pahlavi, two Iranian banks sought to enforce
34. See Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2002) (alteration and
emphasis in original) (quoting TEX. CIV. PROC. & REM. CODE § 36.005(a)(1) (Vernon 1985)); see
also Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasizing that the
"system" must be unfair to preclude recognition and expressing doubt as to the viability of the
"retail approach," which focuses on the particular proceedings).
35. Turner, 303 F.3d at 330.
36. Id.
37. 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir. 1995).
38. See Clinton Approves Order for New Sanctions on Iran, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1995, at
A6 ("President Clinton signed an executive order imposing tough new economic sanctions on
Iran. The move ... bars trade with Iran as well as trade financing ... and new investment in
Iran ...."); Robin Wright, New Sanctions Against Iran Wrong Move, U.S. Allies Say, SEATTLE
TIMES, June 7, 1995 ("The Clinton administration's escalating campaign against Iran -
1170 [Vol. 48:1159
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judgments that they had obtained against Shams Pahlavi, the sister
of the former Shah of Iran, in the tribunals of Iran. 9 In the Iranian
proceedings, the banks served Pahlavi notice by publication. The
Iranian courts entered default judgments in 1982 and 1986 against
Pahlavi for a combined total of $32 million.4°
The banks brought collection actions against Pahlavi in connec-
tion with several promissory notes that she had signed.41 They
sought to enforce their judgments against Pahlavi in a California
federal district court under California's version of the Uniform Act.
4 2
Pahlavi sought to dismiss the action in a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, attaching several documents supporting
her position that the Iranian courts did not afford her due process
in entering the judgments.43 The district court converted her motion
to a motion for summary judgment and granted it. 44
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Pahlavi could not have
received due process in Iran during the period that the Iranian court
entered the judgments against her.45 The Ninth Circuit never
seemed to be concerned with whether the particular judgments at
issue were obtained in a manner that comported with due process.
Instead, the case turned on an assessment of the entire judicial
system of Iran.46 Rather than holding that the Shah's sister was not
afforded due process, the Ninth Circuit held that she could not have
been because during the period from 1982 through 1986, due
process was not available in Iran generally.47
The Ninth Circuit pointed to reports and advisories issued by the
State Department. A 1991 report stated that Iran was a "continuing
state sponsor of terrorism. '4' A Country Report on Human Rights
including U.S. economic sanctions that went into effect yesterday - ends any chance of major
openings in Iran's foreign or domestic policies during the final two years of President Hashemi
Rafsanjani's term in office, ranking envoys from several allied nations charge.").
39. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d at 1407-08.
40. Id. at 1408. The court noted that the banks were "at the very least closely associated
with" the Iranian government. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1410.
46. Id. at 1411-12.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1411.
2007] 1171
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Practices for 1982 stated that Iranian trials, "rarely held in public,"
were "highly politicized," and the judiciary did not enjoy independ-
ence from the Iranian regime.49 The court also found significant a
1990 declaration from a State Department official that judges are
routinely scrutinized in Iran and "cannot be expected to be com-
pletely impartial toward U.S. citizens"; the official also declared that
'".S. claimants can have little reasonable expectation of justice."5
The court acknowledged that those observations pertained to
Americans but concluded that "it can hardly be doubted that they
would apply equally to Pahlavi." 1 The court made this determina-
tion even though Pahlavi herself did not declare that the Iranian
courts would deal unfairly with her." The court also declined to
apply judicial estoppel even though Pahlavi had previously argued
that Iran was the proper forum in another case in which she urged
dismissal for forum non conveniens.53
The court pointed to consular information sheets that "gave travel
warnings from 1981 through 1993 and noted that anti-American
sentiment could make it dangerous to travel in Iran."4 The State
Department had observed that "U.S./Iranian dual nationals have
often had their U.S. passports confiscated upon arrival and have
been denied permission to depart the country documented as U.S.
citizens."5 Furthermore, the court found that there was evidence
indicating it would be dangerous for the Shah's sister if she
returned to Iran.5" While the court acknowledged that the travel
warnings were only applicable to U.S. citizens, it found that the
Shah's sister faced the same threats as Americans in Iran.57 The
Ninth Circuit also pointed to other cases in which federal courts
found that the Iranian courts did not afford Americans fair trials
from the early to the mid-1980s.5" The court found that these other
judicial opinions, and the other evidence presented, were significant
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1412.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1413.
54. Id. at 1411.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1412.
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because "much of the [Iranian] hostility to United States citizens
stemmed from [the United States's] connection to the Shah's
regime."59
The Ninth Circuit asserted that "fair treatment from the courts"
and the ability to appear personally before those courts, to "obtain
proper legal representation," and to obtain witnesses on one's behalf
are "not mere niceties of American jurisprudence";6 0 they are
"ingredients of 'civilized jurisprudence.' 6' The court, therefore,
refused to enforce the Iranian judgments against Pahlavi."
2. Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank
Similarly, in Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, the Second Circuit
refused to recognize and enforce a Liberian judgment because it
found that, at the time of the judgment, the judicial system in
Liberia was plagued by unfairness and instability.63 Bridgeway
differed from Pahlavi in a significant respect-the judgment
creditor did not obtain the judgment by default. The judgment
debtor, Citibank, defended the lawsuit in Liberia and won at the
trial court level, but the Liberian Supreme Court reversed. 
6
The judgment creditor, Bridgeway, had been a customer with
Citibank, which had pulled out of Liberia. Bridgeway still had
$189,376.66 in its account at Citibank's branch in Liberia when
Citibank left the country.65 According to the trial court, Liberian law
provided that Bridgeway had to accept the judgment in Liberian
dollars.66 Moreover, the Court determined that Citibank had the
right to choose the currency with which to pay Bridgeway's balance
under the terms of the parties' contract.67 The Liberian Supreme
Court reversed, and Bridgeway obtained a judgment from that court
in 1993 obligating Citibank to pay Bridgeway's account balance in
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1413.
61. Id. (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205 (1895)).
62. Id.
63. 201 F.3d 134, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2000).
64. Id. at 138-39.
65. Id. at 138.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 139.
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U.S. rather than Liberian dollars.6" Bridgeway then moved to have
a New York state court enforce the judgment, but Citibank removed
the case to federal court.69
The district court granted summary judgment, sua sponte, in
favor of Citibank, holding that, "as a matter of law, Liberia's courts
did not constitute a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an
impartial administration of justice.""0 The Second Circuit affirmed,
finding that there was enough "powerful and uncontradicted
documentary evidence describing the chaos within the Liberian
judicial system during the period of interest to this case to have met
[the burden of proof] and [for Citibank] to be entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.'
The court began its analysis of Liberia's judicial system with an
overview of Liberia's history. Founded in 1817 as a settlement for
emancipated slaves from America, Liberia gained its independence
in 1847.72 Liberia's Constitution "established a government modeled
on that of the United States. 78 Judicial authority was "vested in a
Supreme Court and such subordinate courts as the Legislature may
establish."74 This high court was "composed of one chief justice and
four associate justices," all appointed for life by the President and
approved by the Senate. 75 But the American-style government was
suspended in Liberia during the 1990s. 76 After years of"a Liberian
government marked by corruption and human rights abuses, as well
as by rampant inflation" and a civil war, the 1986 Constitution was
reinstated in 1997. 77
The court found that during the civil war, Liberia's judiciary "was
in a state of disarray and the provisions of the Constitution
concerning the judiciary were no longer followed. '7' An agreement
between the opposing sides reconfigured the Supreme Court. Under
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id. at 141-42.
72. Id. at 137.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 138.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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the agreement, each side independently appointed justices. 79 The
court pointed to State Department reports, one of which observed
that "corruption and incompetent handling of cases remained a
recurrent problem."'
The court rejected Bridgeway's argument that Citibank was
estopped from attacking the impartiality of the Liberian judicial
system."1 Bridgeway pointed out that Citibank had filed several
lawsuits in Liberia since 1992, during the period of the purported
disarray in the Liberian system, and had participated in other cases
in which it was not the plaintiff. 2 In other words, Citibank had
"availed itself' of Liberia's courts without challenging their
fairness. 3 The court refused to conclude that taking advantage of a
foreign judicial system, even though the party is a plaintiff, is
"fundamentally inconsistent" with later asserting that the foreign
system lacks impartiality and fails to afford due process.
Interestingly, though the court in Bridgeway refused to recognize
the Liberian judgment, a year later, it allowed Bridgeway to sue
Citibank for breach of contract.8 5 In other words, the court allowed
Bridgeway to relitigate its claims against Citibank in the United
States. The case went to trial, a jury found in favor of Citibank, and
the Second Circuit upheld the jury's verdict in 2004.8'
The courts in Pahlavi and Bridgeway were comfortable passing
judgment on the judicial and political systems of Iran and Liberia,
respectively. The courts in both of these cases ruled against the
judgment creditors at the summary judgment stage, and the court
in Bridgeway even entered summary judgment sua sponte.87
Both of these cases are remarkable in that the courts never really
required the judgment debtors to make the case that the courts in
the foreign proceedings actually denied them due process. For
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting the U.S. State Department's 1994 Country Report for Liberia).
81. Id. at 141.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. ("Defending a suit where one has been haled into court, and suing where
jurisdiction and venue readily exist do not constitute assertions that the relevant courts are
fair and impartial. Accordingly, we do not view Citibank's voluntary participation in Liberian
litigation, even as a plaintiff, as clearly contradictory to its present position.").
85. Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 91 F. App'x 727, 728-30 (2d Cir. 2004).
86. Id.
87. Bridgeway, 201 F.3d at 137.
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example, the court in Pahlavi easily found that the Shah's sister
could not have received due process, but it never required her to
make the case that she did not.88 In fact, the evidence that the court
relied on dealt largely with the treatment of Americans, and from
this the court drew the inference that Pahlavi could not have
received due process. 9 In both cases, the courts' narratives never
detailed the specifics of the individual proceedings. Instead, the
courts told us the story of these countries' political conflicts and
internal turmoil. 90 The focus on the politics of the countries is
particularly striking in Bridgeway because Citibank actually
litigated the case discussed above as well as several others, often as
plaintiffs.91 On a related point, the court in Pahlavi gave short shrift
to the bank's estoppel arguments even though Pahlavi had, in a
previous case, argued to have a case dismissed for forum non
conveniens because Iran, she argued, was the appropriate forum.92
But the bank's estoppel argument was actually quite strong. In one
forum non conveniens case, the court asserted that a defendant
would be estopped from using the due process provision of the
Uniform Act to challenge the fairness of the Russian system once
that defendant argued that Russia was the appropriate forum.93
At any rate, it would seem that a thorough analysis would
include, and in fact make prominent, a detailing of the actual
proceedings. One is left to wonder whether the actual proceedings
in both cases would have belied the condemnation of these judicial
systems and supported the enforcement of their judgments.
Courts across the country have cited both Pahlavi and Bridgeway
approvingly in their interpretations of the impartial tribunals/fair
procedures exception under the Uniform Act and the Restatement.94
88. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
90. See Bridgeway, 201 F.3d at 138; Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1408, 1411-
12 (9th Cir. 1995).
91. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
93. Pavlov v. Bank of N.Y. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 426, 429, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), vacated on
other grounds, 25 F. App'x 70 (2d Cir. 2002).
94. See Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 330 n.15 (5th Cir. 2002); Bird v. Glacier
Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001); Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d
473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000); Van Den Biggelaar v. Wagner, 978 F. Supp. 848, 858 (N.D. Ind.
1997); Kam-Tech Sys. Ltd. v. Yardeni, 774 A.2d 644, 650 n.4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001);
CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp. N.V., 743 N.Y.S.2d 408, 414-15 (N.Y. App. Div.
1176 [Vol. 48:1159
POLITICAL JUDGING
Apparently many courts consider it largely acceptable to refuse to
recognize a foreign judgment obtained in a "bad" country regardless
of what actually went on in the individual proceedings that resulted
in the judgment. More importantly, it is acceptable to many courts
to condemn other countries' political and judicial systems. Indeed,
under the Pahlavi and Bridgeway analysis, it is unnecessary, and
irrelevant, to address the particulars if a wholesale determination
can be made regarding the fairness of the entire country. This
analytical framework raises the interesting question of what courts
should do when "bad" things-procedures raising serious due
process and fairness concerns--occur in the judicial proceedings of
perceived "good" countries.
C. "Good Country" Cases: The Lloyd's Cases
What if a judgment debtor raised, as a defense to recognition and
enforcement, a serious argument that she was denied due process
in the United Kingdom, whose judiciary is well respected in the
United States? Should courts be satisfied just knowing that as a
general matter the British judiciary is considered fundamentally
fair and that the political system is stable? Can courts, as a
constitutional and institutional matter, ignore the judgment
debtor's due process challenges that she was denied a meaningful
opportunity to be heard and other basic procedural safeguards in
her individual proceedings? Across the country, American judgment
debtors have raised these issues involving the Lloyd's of London
foreign judgment cases. The leading and most prominent of those
cases is Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden.95 The following section
discusses Ashenden in detail but also provides general background
applicable to all of the Lloyd's cases.
In Ashenden, the Seventh Circuit, with Judge Posner writing for
a three-judge panel, was faced with a large-scale scandal involving
Lloyd's of London.96 Lloyd's defrauded thousands of investors,
including American investors, and ultimately successfully obtained
money judgments against the very people whom they defrauded.97
2002).
95. 233 F.3d 473.
96. Id. at 475.
97. Id.; see infra note 100.
2007] 1177
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The Seventh Circuit cast a blind eye to Lloyd's misdeeds and
recognized these British judgments.9" The court's analysis reveals
that it did so-despite strong arguments that there were due
process violations in the British courts-because of the United
States's political relationship with the United Kingdom. 99 This is a
blatant display by the Seventh Circuit, and the courts that followed
its analysis, of outright bias for the British judgments.
1. The Lloyd's Scandal°°
The underlying facts in Ashenden, which were largely undisputed
in the trial court, arose from a large-scale scandal involving Lloyd's
that came to a head in the 1990s. Lloyd's of London "provides the
facilities for and is the regulator of an English insurance market,"
which is among the world's most prominent."' Lloyd's began in the
late 1600s as a "voluntary association" that provided insurance
largely for marine risks.102 Since then, Lloyd's has expanded the
categories of risks that it insures and now has virtually no limita-
tions on such risks. 10 3 Contrary to popular belief, however, Lloyd's
is not an underwriter of insurance."4 Rather, it is a "society" of
"Names" who underwrite insurance but do not actively engage in
the insurance industry. 105 Instead, Names underwrite risks via
98. Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 481.
99. Id. at 476-77.
100. The scandal involving Lloyd's of London, which gave rise to Ashenden, is well
documented. The disgruntled American Names Association (ANA) provides an account on its
website of the events that gave rise to the litigation. Am. Names Ass'n, Truth About Lloyd's
Homepage, http://www.truthaboutlloyds.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2007). Obviously, this
website is entirely from the perspective of the ANA. Nevertheless, many of its claims use, or
are based on, undisputed facts found in Ashenden and the other Lloyd's judgment recognition
cases. Professor Courtland Peterson gives an account of the events surrounding the Lloyd's
litigation. Courtland H. Peterson, Choice of Law and Forum Clauses and the Recognition of
Foreign Country Judgments Revisited Through the Lloyd's of London Cases, 60 LA. L. REV.
1259 (2000); see also Courtland H. Peterson, Limits on the Enforcement of Foreign Country
Judgments and Choice of Law and Forum Clauses, in LAw AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE
WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C.
Symeonides eds., 2002) (detailing the Lloyd's litigation).
101. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, No. 98 C 5335, 1999 WL 284775, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23,
1999).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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"managing agents." "Syndicates," which consist of Names, take on
the underwriting of bigger risks and underwrite specific types of
risks.06 Names make their profits from premiums and investments
on the premium trust fund.'
A Name's individual liability is several rather than joint, and,
therefore, each Name is individually accountable for her own
risks.1"8 There is no limit on their potential losses--except in
accordance with the underwriting itself.0 9 To prevent unlimited
liabilities, syndicates procure reinsurance." 0 Syndicates are dis-
solved after a year, and their remaining liabilities are reinsured
with a subsequent syndicate.'
Prior to 1982, Names were essentially self-governing, having the
authority to pass their own bylaws and rules." 2 The Lloyd's Act of
1982 took this power from the Names and gave it to the Council of
Lloyd's, which the Act created."' The Council is made up of both
managing agents and members. The managing agents, however,
hold the deciding vote." 4 Significantly, the Lloyd's Act authorized
the Council to appoint "substitute agents," who would have the
power "to act on behalf of members for the proper regulation of the
business of insurance at Lloyd's.""'
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Lloyd's experienced over $12 billion
in losses largely because of liabilities resulting from 'long tail"
cases, like those involving asbestos and other exposure." 6 Ulti-
mately, attempting to save Lloyd's and secure its future, the council
devised a settlement plan called "Reconstruction and Renewal.""' 7
Under this plan, Lloyd's and the Names "exchange[d] mutual
releases.""' 8 The council also created an independent entity, named
Equitas, that reinsured the problem risks from the pre-1992
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *2.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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period." 9 Equitas was funded by the Lloyd's Central Fund and from
the Names' reinsurance payments. 2 ° The majority of the Names
accepted the Reconstruction and Renewal plan in June 1996.121 In
accordance with the plan, the Names, including those who rejected
the settlement, were provided with reinsurance.'22 Those Names
refusing to settle, however, were not included in the "mutual waiver
of claims."'23
Significantly, there were provisions in the Reconstruction and
Renewal Plan that shielded Lloyd's from being tangled in extended
litigation. Specifically, Names could not claim any offset against
Lloyd's and could not dispute the amount of their reinsurance
premiums in any lawsuits brought by Lloyd's to collect the reinsur-
ance premiums.'24 To ensure that these provisions were enforceable
even against the nonsettling Names, the Council had a "substitute
agent" sign the Equitas reinsurance contract on behalf of the
nonsettling Names. 2 ' The Council was able to appoint this substi-
tute agent pursuant to a bylaw it had enacted in 1983, which
authorized the appointment of substitute agents. 126 In 1995, when
the Council enacted the Reconstruction and Renewal Plan, it also
enacted a bylaw that authorized substitute agents to sign the
Equitas reinsurance contract for the Names." 7 Lloyd's asserted the
authority to do so pursuant to the 1982 Lloyd's Act, which gave it
the power to make bylaws "to further the objectives of the
Society.-' 1
21
Nonsettling Names brought test cases in the United Kingdom to
challenge Lloyd's ability to enact the Reconstruction and Renewal
Plan and specific provisions of the reinsurance contract. 129 The
British courts affirmed Lloyd's power to enact the Plan."' The
119. Id.
120. Id. at **2-3. The Lloyd's Central Fund was earlier created by Lloyd's to deal with the
huge losses and to which Names contributed. Id. at *2.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *3.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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British courts also upheld the validity of the "pay now, sue later"
clause, which prevented "the Names from claiming any set-offs,
including damages for fraud," from the reinsurance premium."'
Additionally, the British courts upheld the "conclusive evidence"
clause of the reinsurance contract; under that clause, whatever
Lloyd's determined the premium amount to be was conclusive
evidence between the Names and Equitas.'32
2. Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden
The defendants in Ashenden were a husband and wife, both
residents of Illinois.'33 James Ashenden became a Name in 1977,
and Mary Jane Ashenden became a Name in 1984.134 The
Ashendens were recruited to join Lloyd's by R.W. Sturge & Co., a
managing agent for the association, and initially invested £70,000
after Sturge lured the Ashendens into Lloyd's by assuring them that
Lloyd's was an esteemed and time-honored institution that only
invested in "conservative risks. ' 13' For years, Sturge continued to
reassure the Ashendens regarding the security of their investment
in Lloyd's. 36 Sturge never informed them that they faced tremen-
dous losses because of asbestos claims. 137 At Sturge's urging, they
invested even more in Lloyd's.1 31
In 1991, Lloyd's called on the Ashendens to help cover increasing
losses sustained by the syndicates. 13 The losses mostly stemmed
from insurance policies with "general liability" and no "aggregation
limits" that "had been successively reinsured without adequate
reserves."' 4° Some of the liability policies dated back as far as the
1930s."' Lloyd's covered the Ashendens' "continuing underwriting
liabilities" with their letters of credit. The Ashendens and forty-
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *4.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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three other Illinois Names ultimately sued Lloyd's and several of its
agents in Illinois state court.142 The Names argued that the
defendants violated Illinois securities and consumer protection
laws.'43 Lloyd's removed the case, and the district court dismissed
because of choice of law and forum clauses that the Names had
previously signed.'
Subsequently, Lloyd's sent the Ashendens the settlement plan,
which included "finality statements" that set forth demands from
each of them for the balance that they owed from their underwriting
liabilities and from their shares of the Equitas reinsurance pre-
mium.145 Lloyd's demanded £179,430 from James Ashenden and
£222,668 from Mary Jane Ashenden. Their individual liabilities
would be reduced to £100,000 if they executed the mutual
releases.'46 The Ashendens refused the settlement offer, and they
instructed their agent not to sign the reinsurance agreements for
them. 47 But Lloyd's made the reinsurance payments for the non-
settling Names, like the Ashendens, who refused to sign the
reinsurance contract. Equitas assigned its claims against those
Names to Lloyd's. 48 Lloyd's then sued those Names, including the
Ashendens, in the United Kingdom. 149 Lloyd's had no problem
winning at the summary judgment stage because of the "pay now,
sue later" and "conclusive evidence" clauses.' The British court
denied the Names leave to appeal; the British judgment was final,
valid, and enforceable.
151
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner began his analysis
by outlining Illinois's version of the Uniform Foreign Country
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which renders a foreign
judgment unenforceable if rendered by a court outside the United
States if the judgment was "rendered under a system which does
not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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requirements of due process of law. 15 2 The court found the word
"system" fatal to the Ashendens' position.153 Judge Posner noted
that the judgments against the defendants were obtained in
Great Britain's High Court, "which corresponds to our federal
district courts; they were affirmed by the Court of Appeal, which
corresponds to the federal courts of appeals; and the Appellate
Committee of the House of Lords, which corresponds to the U.S.
Supreme Court, denied the defendants' petition for review."15 4 Judge
Posner asserted that "[a]ny suggestion that this system of courts
'does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with
the requirements of due process of law' borders on the risible." '155
Posner boldly and unequivocally declared that "It]he courts of
England are fair and neutral forums."5 6 He further asserted that
British courts "are highly regarded for impartiality, professionalism,
and scrupulous regard for procedural rights."' 7
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the relevant Illinois act
provided that only the system under which a foreign judgment was
entered be "compatible with" American notions of due process, not
identical.5 ' The foreign system's procedures need only be "funda-
mentally fair" and not offend "basic fairness."'59 Posner called this
notion the "international concept of due process," 6 ° a concept
much different "from the complex concept that has emerged from
American case law."'' According to Judge Posner, there was no
"serious question" that the United Kingdom's judicial system
comports with the international concept of due process.162 In another
rather bold and audacious assertion, Posner declared that had the
judgment at issue "been rendered by Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq,
Congo, or some other nation whose adherence to the rule of law and
152. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original)
(quoting 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-621).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th
Cir. 1992)).
156. Id. (quoting Riley, 969 F.2d at 958).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 477 (emphasis in original).
159. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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commitment to the norm of due process are open to serious ques-
tion," the court may have considered the type of evidence needed to
show a denial of international due process.'63 Presumably, this may
have included the type of evidence that the courts in Pahlavi and
Bridgeway considered.
The Seventh Circuit next rejected the Ashendens' argument that
the court should examine the particular proceedings in which
Lloyd's obtained the judgments against them instead of looking only
at the British judicial system generally. 1" Because of the Uniform
Act's focus on the "system," Posner concluded that the Act did not
call for "a retail approach, which would moreover be inconsistent
with providing a streamlined, expeditious method for collecting
money judgments rendered by courts in other jurisdictions-which
would in effect give the judgment creditor a further appeal on the
merits."'65 Judge Posner emphasized that "[t]he process of collecting
a judgment is not meant to require a second lawsuit, thus convert-
ing every successful multinational suit for damages into two
suits.
' 166
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit concluded that, assuming the
"retail approach" were justified, there would be no requirement that
a foreign court utilize procedures that "conform[ed] to the specifics
of the American doctrine of due process." ' 7 Consequently, the court
found that "even the retail approach, in order to get within miles of
being reasonable, would have to content itself with requiring foreign
conformity to the international concept of due process." 6 ' Thus,
Judge Posner's ideal international due process analysis only looks
at the entire system from which the judgment originated. And he
also indicated that if a retail approach were permissible, which he
seriously doubted, even that approach would be a watered-down,
weak notion of due process.'69
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (internal citations omitted).
167. Id. at 478.
168. Id.
169. See id. ("Even if the retail approach is valid-and we want to emphasize our belief that
it is not-it cannot possibly avail the defendants here unless they are right that the approach
requires subjecting the foreign proceeding to the specifics of the American doctrine of due
process.").
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Though stressing that it was unnecessary, for the "sake of
completeness," the Seventh Circuit considered whether the particu-
lar foreign proceedings in which Lloyd's obtained the judgment
against the Ashendens comported with this watered down notion of
due process. 7 ° The court found no due process violations under
international or domestic standards.' 7 ' The court recognized that
the pay now, sue later and conclusive evidence provisions
"curtail[ed] the [Nlames' procedural rights"; but the court also
pointed out that "due process is not a fixed menu of procedural
rights. How much process is due depends on the circumstances." '172
The circumstances relevant to the court were that Lloyd's was in
danger of folding and adopted the pay now, sue later clause to fund
Equitas fully.' According to the court, the fund benefited the
Names by providing them with reinsurance.'74 The court found the
pay now, sue later clause was "reasonable" in exchange for the
reinsurance. 7' Additionally, the court asserted that without the
clause, "many other [N]ames might have forced Lloyd's into
collection litigation as well."'76 The court found nothing improper
about the clause or the British court's enforcement of the clause.'77
The British court merely enforced the clause "on the basis of an
interpretation of a provision of the original contract between the
names and Lloyd's that authorized Lloyd's to take measures
unilaterally to prevent the society from failing."'78 In other words,
"the [N]ames had waived their procedural rights in advance."'79 At
any rate, the court found it doubtful that mere "contract interpreta-
tion" could form the basis for a due process challenge."
The court analyzed the conclusive evidence clause similarly,
although it noted that this clause "extinguishes [the Names' rights]
by shrinking [their] entitlement to a right to the rectification of only
170. Id. at 478-79.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 479 (citing Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930-31 (1997); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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those errors that leap out from the assessment figure itself with no
right to pretrial discovery to search out possible errors in the
actuarial or other assumptions that generated the figure."'1 This
might be an issue, the court found, if there was a "substantive
component" to the international due process inquiry."8 2 The
rationale for the conclusive evidence clause, and for the denial of full
discovery regarding the accuracy of the premium assessment, was
that "the funding of Equitas would be delayed."'83 The court found
that the one substantive ground for nonrecognition under the
Uniform Act was the public policy exception, which the plaintiffs
had abandoned."' Again, the court found that the key question was
not the fairness of the Lloyd's measures but the fairness of the
English court in holding that Lloyd's was authorized by its contract
with the Names to appoint agents to negotiate a contract that would
bind the Names without the Names' consent.8 5 The court found that
this interpretation of the contract was not so unreasonable that it
could be thought of as a denial of international due process, even if
international due process had a substantive component.18
It is important to note that the Seventh Circuit's international
due process rule outlined the parameters of the procedural due
process inquiry required for foreign judgments. Notwithstanding
what happened in the individual proceedings, there was no
procedural due process problem in the court's view because as a
matter of law British courts are generally fair. And while this
Article is mostly concerned with critiquing the international
procedural due process analysis that Judge Posner and other judges
have formulated, in Part III I will return to the substantive due
process issue that Judge Posner raised with respect to the conclu-
sive evidence clause.'87 In Part III, I address the free speech foreign
181. Id. at 480.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 476 (emphasizing that the proper inquiry is into the fairness of the English court
system).
186. Id. at 479 ("In these circumstances the clause did not violate international due process
or, we add unnecessarily, domestic due process.").
187. "[T]he Due Process Clause contains a substantive component that bars certain
arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). The Due Process Clause also guarantees "fair procedure." Id. "In
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judgment cases; and I will demonstrate that, contrary to the
Seventh Circuit's suggestions, the state action doctrine mandates
that there must also be a substantive component to the due process
analysis of foreign judgments.
The Seventh Circuit's watered down international due process
analysis ignored the fact that the British court entered a judgment
against the Ashendens for the Equitas reinsurance premiums even
though the Ashendens never had any real opportunity to contest
the Lloyd's assessment of those premiums or to claim any set off."' 8
In fact, the district court, applying American due process law, found
that the British courts did not afford the Names an adequate
hearing so that the Names "were not allowed seriously to challenge
the claims brought against them by Lloyd's."' 9 By focusing on the
Ashendens' contract with Lloyd's, however, the Seventh Circuit
enforced a judgment that the British court entered without afford-
ing the Ashendens a meaningful opportunity to be heard. As the
court saw it, the Names waived their procedural due process rights
when they initially contracted with Lloyd's to become Names. The
court, however, failed to point to any provision in the standardized
Lloyd's contract where the Names agreed to be bound by a settle-
ment with Lloyd's signed by substitute agents, and to have no
meaningful opportunity to assert fraud claims against Lloyd's. The
Seventh Circuit's focus on the contract was specious, and it ignored
the essence of the Names' argument. The Names claimed-and
there is ample undisputed evidence to support them-that Lloyd's
procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected
interest in 'life, liberty, or property' is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional
is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law." Id.
188. Compare Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, No. 98 C 5335, 1999 WL 284775, at *4, *7 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 23, 1999) (noting that the British court granted Lloyd's summary judgment), with
Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 478-80 (failing to mention that the British court granted Lloyd's
summary judgment).
189. Ashenden, 1999 WL 284775, at *7. The district court found that the British courts did
indeed deny the Ashendens a "pre-deprivation hearing." Id. But the court found that this
denial was not necessarily in violation of due process if there was an "effective post-
deprivation remedy." Id. The district court's analysis is somewhat more satisfying than the
Seventh Circuit's analysis because it at least recognized that the British courts failed to
provide the Ashendens with a meaningful hearing. Id. But the district court's ultimate
conclusion that the Names had an effective postdeprivation remedy in that they could file
separate suits for fraud in the United Kingdom, id., is doubtful given the history of the Lloyd's
litigation. See supra note 100.
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never disclosed the tremendous losses that had accrued and were
continuing to accrue when they signed their contracts with Lloyd's
and became investors. It seems fundamentally unfair, and contrary
to common sense, to interpret the standardized contracts that they
signed when they became Names to mean that Lloyd's could appoint
substitute agents to waive the Names' rights unilaterally to contest
the very fraud that led them to become Names. It is highly doubtful,
and the court did not really suggest, that the Names understood
Lloyd's authority to appoint substitute agents would result in their
current predicament-having no meaningful opportunity to contest
a settlement agreement entered on their behalf and specifically
against their wishes and no meaningful opportunity to raise their
fraud claims or any other defenses against Lloyd's.
Whether one ultimately agrees or disagrees that the British
courts failed to afford the Names due process is not so much the
point here. This case is significant for the international procedural
due process analysis that it embraced. After all, the court's "analy-
sis" of the individual proceedings was merely dicta. Indeed, the case
stands for the proposition that the individual proceedings in the
foreign system are irrelevant. It matters only whether the entire
judicial system is, in the court's view, fundamentally fair.19 Such a
rule encourages-indeed requires--courts to look the other way
when presented with questionable judgments from favored coun-
tries.
Across the country, other federal courts have taken the Seventh
Circuit's lead in embracing "international due process" and enforc-
ing the British judgments against the American Names. 9' The
190. See, e.g., Kreditverein Der Bank Austria v. Nejezchleba, Civil No. 04-72 (JRT/JSM),
2006 WL 1851129, at *2 (D. Minn. June 30, 2006) (citingAshenden and finding that "[t]he 'due
process' ground for nonrecognition in the Uniform Act is distinct from, and less demanding
than, the concept of 'due process' as it has been defined in American case law. Rather than
requiring that a foreign country's legal system conform to the specific nuances of American
law, the requirement of 'due process' in the Uniform Act simply means that the foreign
country's system of law is 'fundamentally fair' and does not offend against 'basic fairness"'
(internal citation omitted)).
191. See Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Siemon-Netto, 457 F.3d 94, 105-06 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing
Ashenden with approval); Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 994 (10th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 366 (2005) (agreeing with Ashenden and noting "[olur courts have long
recognized that the courts of England are fair and neutral forums" (quoting Riley v. Kingsley
Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992))); Soc'y of Lloyds v. Borgers,
127 F. App'x 959, 960 (9th Cir. 2005) (declaring that the British system "comports with our
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Seventh Circuit's decision raises numerous concerns regarding the
role of the judiciary generally and, in particular, in dealing with
judgments from foreign countries. Following the Seventh Circuit's
lead, courts can pass judgment on other judicial systems with little
or no evidentiary bases for their assessments. After all, Judge
Posner just assumed the fairness of the British system with no real
analysis.'92 Likewise, he advocated that courts can label other
countries as fundamentally unfair or "uncivilized" with no real
analysis. 9 '
standards of due process" and citing Ashenden); Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Edelman, No. 03 Civ.4921
(WHP) 2005 VL 639412, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005) (citing Ashenden and finding that "[it
is incontrovertible that the English judicial system provides impartial tribunals and
'procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law"); Soc'y of Lloyds v. Webb,
156 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638-40 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (citing Ashenden and asserting that "[g]iven the
structure of the English system, which is substantially similar to our own, Webb's suggestion
that the English court system does not provide tribunals compatible with due process in [sic]
not tenable"). In Society of Lloyd's v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002), the Fifth Circuit
decided a case brought by other Names involving the same facts. See id. at 326-29. The Fifth
Circuit basically adopted the Seventh Circuit's analysis and found that the British system was
fundamentally fair. Id. at 330-31. In a footnote, the court stated that it "need not speculate
on the outcome of th[e] case" had the Names shown that their individual proceedings were
fundamentally unfair because the British courts had applied typical British contract law. Id.
at 331 n.22. Interestingly, however, the court cited to an old Texas Supreme Court case called
Banco Minero v. Ross, 172 S.W. 711 (Tex. 1915), in which the court refused to enforce a
Mexican judgment because the particular proceedings, and not the Mexican system as a
whole, were unfair. Turner, 303 F.3d at 331 n.22. In Banco Minero the Texas Supreme Court
applied the Hilton rule to determine whether a Mexican judgment should be recognized.
Banco Minero, 172 S.W. at 714-15. The court stated that "the chief requisite for the
recognition of a foreign judgment necessarily is that an opportunity for a full and fair trial
was afforded." Id. at 714. The court found that the proceedings in the Mexican court were
"wanting in these essential elements." Id. at 715. According to the court, the judgment debtor
pleaded a "good defense, yet ... he was denied the right to present it," and the Mexican court
rendered the judgment "upon no proof whatever." Id. In Turner the Fifth Circuit sidestepped
the issue of whether Banco's approach-which analyzed the fairness of particular proceedings
as opposed to the much more general look at the entire legal system of the foreign
country-was correct. Turner, 303 F.3d at 331 n.22. In Society of Lloyd's v. Mullin, 255 F.
Supp. 2d 468, 470-73 (E.D. Pa. 2003), the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also enforced the
Lloyd's judgments against yet another Name, J. Edmund Mullin. Id. The court adopted the
Seventh Circuit's analysis and stated that its inquiry was restricted to "a panoramic
examination of the English judiciary, [or], the English 'system." Id. at 472. An evaluation of
the particulars of the British court decisions was not required. Id. at 472.
192. See Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 476-78.
193. See id.
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II. "NAKED POLITICAL JUDGMENTS": A SEPARATION OF POWERS
CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL DUE PROCESS
In his Foreword to the Harvard Law Review in November 2005,
Judge Posner harshly criticized Justice Kennedy's opinion in Roper
v. Simmons,194 calling it a "naked political judgment":
Strip Roper v. Simmons of its fig leaves-the psychological
literature that it misused, the global consensus to which it
pointed, the national consensus that it concocted by treating
states that have no capital punishment as having decided that
juveniles have a special claim not to be executed (the equivalent
of saying that these states had decided that octogenarians
deserve a special immunity from capital punishment)-and you
reveal a naked political judgment. 9'
Judge Posner argued that Roper v. Simmons and Lawrence v.
Texas'96 represented "aggressive political judging" on the part of the
Court, the type of decision making in which a legislature would
engage. 9 ' He urged the Supreme Court to adopt a "modest judge"
approach to constitutional review, which would have no room for
reliance on foreign precedent to establish American constitutional
norms.'9 ' But the international due process analysis that Posner
established in the Lloyd's cases is a form of aggressive political
judging, much more so than Roper and Lawrence. Indeed, if you
strip the Lloyd's cases of their fig leaves, of which there are very
few, you reveal naked political judgments-the type of decision
making in which the executive branch should engage.' 99
This Part argues that the international due process analysis is
beyond the competence of state and federal judges. The interna-
tional due process analysis requires action that is unsuitable for
judges, who are obligated to settle disputes between individuals
and not to formulate international policies. The international due
194. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
195. Posner, supra note 4, at 90.
196. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
197. Posner, supra note 4, at 54-60, 84-90.
198. Id. at 54.
199. See infra Part II.B.
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process analysis requires judges to reach beyond their constitution-
ally delineated roles and make foreign policy.
First, this Part addresses the ability of state judges to engage in
the international due process analysis. Whereas federal courts
sitting in diversity are the usual forums for foreign judgment
recognition cases, 200 state courts still have the power to preside over
such cases.201 Should state court judges engage in the international
due process analysis, they too will be impermissibly making foreign
policy, violating the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.0 2 The majority
of this Part, however, is devoted to the separation of powers problem
posed by federal judges engaging in the international due process
analysis. In exploring the limited role of the judiciary in foreign
relations, this Part will draw from the principles underlying the
political question doctrine, which one scholar recently dubbed the
"heartland of judicial abstention.""3 The doctrine is most viable in
foreign relations cases, as courts apply it most often in such cases.
After establishing the courts' limitations in the foreign relations
arena, this Part provides a separation of powers critique of the
international due process exception to foreign judgment recognition.
Specifically, it argues that U.S. courts lack the institutional com-
petence to undertake the international due process analysis. It also
argues that, should courts continue to apply this analysis, there will
be an increasing potential to embarrass the executive branch in
its foreign relations efforts. Moreover, it argues that the type of
inherent value judgment required of courts applying the interna-
tional due process analysis is, at best, unsuitable for courts and, at
worst, highly political and unduly susceptible to the prejudices and
biases of individual judges.
200. See, e.g., Sw. Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ram6n, 169 F.3d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1999)
("Our jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Hence, we must apply Texas law
regarding the recognition of foreign country money-judgments."); Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955
F.2d 875, 880, 882 (4th Cir. 1992) (interpreting the Maryland Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act); Corporacion Salvadorena de Calzado, S.A. v. Injection Footwear
Corp., 533 F. Supp. 290, 295 (S.D. Fla. 1982) ("Plaintiff is seeking to domesticate this foreign
judgment under the law of the State of Florida and jurisdiction of this Court is predicated
solely on diversity.").
201. See infra Part IIA.
202. Id.
203. Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REv. 941, 943 (2004).
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A. State Courts and International Due Process
Undoubtedly, the international due process analysis involves the
conduct of foreign policy: the Supreme Court has struck down a
state statute containing an almost identical analysis because it
violated the federal foreign affairs doctrine." 4 In Zschernig v. Miller,
the Court found that an Oregon statute unconstitutionally permit-
ted states to establish their own foreign policy.2 °5 Under the statute,
a foreign citizen could not inherit property unless he proved to an
Oregon court that his home country (1) would grant U.S. citizens a
"reciprocal right" to take property on the same terms as its own
citizens; (2) assured U.S. citizens the right to receive payment here
of funds originating from estates in that country; and (3) gave its
own citizens the benefits, use, and control of property received from
an Oregon estate "without confiscation. 2 6
The Zschernig Court found that the "history and operation of [the]
statute ma[de] clear that [it was] an intrusion by the State into
the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the
President and the Congress."20 7 It also noted that under such
statutes,
various states ha[d] launched inquiries into the type of
governments that obtain in particular foreign nations-whether
aliens under their law have enforceable rights, whether the so-
called "rights" are merely dispensations turning upon the whim
or caprice of government officials, whether the representation of
consuls, ambassadors, and other representatives of foreign
nations is credible or made in good faith, whether there is in the
actual administration in the particular foreign system of law any
element of confiscation. °8
The Court found that these state court decisions "radiate [d] some of
the attitudes of the 'cold war,' where the search [was] for the
204. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 430-31.
207. Id. at 432.
208. Id. at 434.
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'democracy quotient' of a foreign regime as opposed to the Marxist
theory."2 °9
The Supreme Court found that the statute made "unavoidable
judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian
basis than our own."'2 10 In striking down the Oregon statute, the
Court held that the law demonstrated the danger involved if each
state, speaking through its courts, were permitted to establish its
own foreign policy.2" According to the Court, "[elxperience has
shown that international controversies of the gravest moment,
sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined
wrongs to another's subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a govern-
ment." '212 The Court noted a state's inability to establish its own
foreign policy: "Certainly a State could not deny admission to a
traveler from East Germany nor bar its citizens from going there. If
there are to be such restraints, they must be provided by the
Federal Government."2 '3 Though it found that the Oregon statute
was "not as gross an intrusion in the federal domain as those others
might be," it still found that the statute had a "direct impact upon
foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the
central government to deal with those problems." '214
Some scholars called Zschernig "anomalous,""2 ' questioning its
vitality and claiming that the Court has neglected it. 21 But the
Supreme Court recently relied on Zschernig in American Insurance
Ass'n v. Garamendi, and struck down California's Holocaust Victim
Insurance Relief Act on the grounds that it interfered with the
209. Id. at 435.
210. Id. at 440.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 441 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941)).
213. Id. (citations omitted).
214. Id.
215. See Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Essay, Who's Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment?
The Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 257
(2006).
216. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1617, 1700-01 (1997) (arguing that Supreme Court jurisprudence has undercut Zschernig).
But see Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1824, 1847-48 (1998) (conceding that scholars have "appropriately criticized
[Zschernig] for its failure to delineate" clear standards for determining when a state
legislation has such an impact on foreign relations to "be deemed specifically preempted," but
arguing that "nothing in that jurisprudence speaks to 'restoring to the states external foreign
affairs powers that were not reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment").
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President's conduct of foreign affairs.217 Even Justice Ginsburg, in
her dissent in Garamendi, seemed to recognize the problem with
state statutes that require courts to pass judgments on foreign
countries. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, and
Thomas, would not have extended Zschernig to invalidate the
statute in Garamendi. She distinguished the Holocaust statute
from the statute in Zschernig: "The notion of 'dormant foreign
affairs preemption' with which Zschernig is associated resonates
most audibly when a state action 'reflect[s] a state policy critical
of foreign governments and involve[s] sitting in judgment on
them."21
In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,219 a pre-Garamendi
case which raised questions of federalism and foreign affairs, the
Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts law restricting state
purchases from companies doing business in Burma.22 ° The lower
court relied on Zschernig in striking down the law,221 but the
Supreme Court narrowed the holding of the case and based its
invalidation of the law on the notion that it conflicted with a federal
sanctions law dealing with Burma. Though the Court had an
opportunity to overrule Zschernig, it did not. It has been argued
that the "deeper theory" at play in Crosby was the separation of
powers.222 Though the Supreme Court in Crosby narrowed the
217. 539 U.S. 396, 424-25 (2003).
218. Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 164
(2d ed. 1996)). Prior to Garamendi, some scholars had also stated that Zschernig was limited
to its facts. See Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the
Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1145 (2000) ("Consequently, some believe that
Zschernig is confined to its facts, and only proscribes state-directed inquiries, particularly by
courts, into the nature or operation of foreign governments.").
219. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
220. Id. at 373-74. The statute barred state entities from doing business with persons or
businesses on an identified '"purchase list' of those doing business with Burma." Id. at 367.
The statute exempted certain entities from the boycott, such as those providing medical
services or those in Burma solely to report the news. Id.
221. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,51 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that
the Massachusetts Burma Law is unconstitutional under Zschernig and emphasizing that
Zschernig is still binding precedent).
222. John C. Yoo, Foreign Affairs Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 46 VILL. L. REV.
1341, 1344 (2001) ("Crosby ... is more of a separation of powers case than a federalism case.
Much of the Court's language does not emphasize the federal government's powers in foreign
relations-instead, it praises the President's powers.").
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holding to the conflict of the state law with federal goals, it empha-
sized the President's role in conducting foreign affairs.223 While
Zschernig recognized that the role of foreign policymaking is an area
that should be handled on the federal level, Crosby at least implic-
itly recognized that within the federal government, it is the
executive that is best suited to make these decisions.224
The international due process provision is strikingly similar to
the Oregon statute and the Massachusetts statutes in the Burma
cases. Interestingly, in his Zschernig concurrence, Justice Harlan
pointed out that the majority's analysis would invalidate the
Uniform Act's provision that a foreign country's judgment is not
conclusive if the judgment "was rendered under a system which does
not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law, 226 that is, the provision on
which the international due process analysis is based.22 ' The
concurrence was correct to note the similarities between the
international due process provision in the Uniform Act and the
Oregon statute. Both require state courts to make their own foreign
policy and violate the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
B. The Political Question Doctrine and the Limited Role of the
Federal Judiciary in Foreign Affairs
In the federal system, it is a well settled tenet of the separation
of powers doctrine that "[t]he conduct of ... foreign relations ... is
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative"
223. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380-81 ("Mhe state Act is at odds with the President's intended
authority to speak for the United States among the world's nations in developing a
'comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve human rights
practices and the quality of life in Burma."' (quoting Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(c), 110 Stat.
3009-166 (1996))).
224. Similarly, in both United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942), and United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937), the Supreme Court preempted state law that
conflicted with the President's conduct of foreign relations in regard to the Soviet Union.
225. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429,461 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act § 4(a)(1)).
226. In his concurrence, Justice Harlan stated that "[i]f the flaw in the statute is said to
be that it requires state courts to inquire into the administration of foreign law, I would
suggest that that characteristic is shared by other legal rules which I cannot believe the Court
wishes to invalidate." Id.
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branches-the "political" branches of government.227 Though courts
have no authority to make foreign policy, interestingly, it is largely
up to the courts to ensure that they do not aggrandize themselves
in this area. Federal courts have created checks on themselves
through judicially created doctrines such as the political question
doctrine, the act of state doctrine, and the noninquiry rule. The
irony, as one scholar has noted, is that when exercising these
doctrines of judicial restraint, courts often engage in the very type
of conduct-foreign policymaking-that is constitutionally beyond
their authority.22 Even more disturbing is that courts often fail to
invoke doctrines of judicial restraint; in other words, they bypass
the issue altogether, and proceed directly to foreign policymaking.
This latter phenomenon occurs with respect to the international due
process analysis of foreign judgments. Of course, judicial involve-
ment in disputes between parties that may touch on foreign affairs
is necessary, particularly in the context of international civil
litigation.229 Judges cannot-and no one suggests that they should
-avoid all cases with foreign relations implications. They, neverthe-
less, lack any legitimate authority to make foreign policy, as
recognized by the doctrines of restraint that judges have created.23 °
227. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); see also Attorney Gen. of Can.
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 114 (2d Cir. 2001) ("When a foreign
nation appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement of its revenue laws, the
judiciary risks being drawn into issues and disputes of foreign relations policy that are
assigned to-and better handled by-the political branches of government."); United States
ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[S]o-called political questions
are denied judicial scrutiny, not only because they invite courts to intrude into the province
of coordinate branches of government, but also because courts are fundamentally
underequipped to formulate national policies or develop standards of conduct for matters not
legal in nature.").
228. Jack I. Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-making in International Civil Litigation:
Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 461 (1993)
(discussing the "phenomenon" of judicial foreign policymaking in the wake of globalization and
noting that "[iun contemporary international litigation ... there is critical foreign policy-
making by the courts that cannot be justified, historically or functionally, as within the
capacities of the judicial branch").
229. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (explaining
that "one of the Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and [the court] cannot
shirk this responsibility merely because (its] decision may have significant political
overtones").
230. See Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 513 (D.D.C. 1990) ("The judicial branch, on the
other hand, is neither equipped nor empowered to intrude into the realm of foreign affairs
where the Constitution grants operational powers only to the two political branches and
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One arm of the Supreme Court's separation of powers jurispru-
dence deals with the nonjusticiability of so-called "political ques-
tions."23' The Supreme Court has long recognized that questions
involving foreign relations are inherently political,232 but there are
no hard line rules for determining whether an issue is too political
for the courts to address. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that
"[d] eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been commit-
ted, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation." '233
The Supreme Court has defined the political question by examining
cases in which it has been applied and "infer[ing] from them the
analytical threads that make up the political question doctrine." '234
The doctrine and its underlying policies are applicable to the
international due process analysis. Even though under the Erie
doctrine, a federal court adjudicating state law claims must apply
the substantive law of the relevant state,2 s the Supreme Court has
made exceptions to this doctrine when deciding cases that specifi-
cally affect federal interests.23 For instance, an exception arises
when the federal interest at stake concerns the foreign relations of
the United States: "Because our foreign relations could be impaired
by the application of state laws, which do not necessarily reflect
national interests, federal law applies to these cases even where
the court has diversity jurisdiction. 23 v Thus, even though foreign
judgment recognition law in this country is state law, the political
where decisions are made based on political and policy considerations.").
231. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
232. Id. at 211 ('There are sweeping statements to the effect that all questions touching
foreign relations are political questions.").
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
236. See Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938)). In
Hinderlider, which the Supreme Court decided the same day as Erie, the Court addressed
issues regarding state boundaries and the apportionment of interstate waters: "For whether
the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question
of 'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can
be conclusive." 304 U.S. at 110.
237. Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1232-33 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964)).
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question doctrine and its underlying principles are applicable when
the foreign relations of the United States could be impaired by the
application of state judgment recognition law.23 The next subsection
looks at the origins of the doctrine and its limitations on federal
courts' involvement in foreign affairs.
1. Origins of the Doctrine
The origins of the political question doctrine can be traced
back to Chief Justice John Marshall. Before joining the Supreme
Court, Marshall gave a powerful speech before the House of
Representatives in support of President Adams and against efforts
to have the President censured. That speech laid the foundation for
the political question doctrine and also established the uniqueness
of foreign relations in the separation of powers model.
President Adams had ordered the extradition of Thomas Nash to
Great Britain. Nash had been accused of murdering a naval officer
while aboard a British ship.239 Adams's opponents submitted a
resolution in the House of Representatives censuring Adams for a
"dangerous interference of the Executive with Judicial decisions."24
In his speech, Marshall discussed the role of the judiciary to decide
legal issues presented by the parties before them. He stated that
"[b]y extending the Judicial power to all cases in law and equity, the
Constitution had never been understood to confer on that depart-
ment any political power whatever." '241 He further stated that "[t]o
come within this description [of cases in law and equity], a question
must assume a legal form for forensic litigation and judicial
decision. There must be parties to come into court, who can be
reached by its process, and ... whose rights admit of ultimate
decision by a tribunal to which they are bound to submit." '242
238. See, e.g., id. at 1229-33 (applying the federal common law of foreign affairs, including
the political question doctrine, to state law claims by plaintiff against two German banks to
recover money that they allegedly stole from her family through the Nazi Regime's
"Aryanization" program).
239. John Marshall, Address Before the House of Representatives (Mar. 7, 1800), in 10
ANNA S OF CONG. 596, 597 (1851).
240. Id. at 533.
241. Id. at 606.
242. Id.
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In his speech, Marshall also expounded on the President's role as
the sole authority to engage in "external relations":
The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. Of
consequence, the demand of a foreign nation can only be made
on him.
He possesses the whole Executive power. He holds and directs
the force of the nation. Of consequence, any act to be performed
by the force of a nation is to be performed through him.
The Executive is not only the Constitutional department, but
seems to be the proper department, to which the power in
question may most wisely and most safely be confided.243
Marshall understood that certain decisions were simply not within
the courts' expertise, but were to be determined by the executive
branch, which is uniquely positioned to make those decisions. It is
the Executive who is in the best position to determine the state of
relations between the United States and other nations; and those
relations are subject to change at any time. So, decisions involving
external relations necessarily require political discretion. Marshall
also understood that there was a distinction to be drawn between
political decisions and legal decisions, with only the latter being
appropriate for the judiciary.
From a historical perspective, Marshall's speech was not simply
rhetoric. The principle that he espoused in that speech-that
political issues are beyond the competency of courts-is as firmly
rooted in American jurisprudence as the fundamental principle of
judicial review that Marshall later espoused in Marbury v.
Madison.2" Indeed, three years after his speech, then-Chief Justice
Marshall explained in Marbury that there is a category of cases, the
deciding of which constitutes "political act[s], belonging to the
executive department alone, for the performance of which, entire
confidence is placed by our constitution in the supreme executive;
and for any misconduct respecting which, the injured individual has
243. Id. at 613-14.
244. See Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164 (1803)).
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no remedy. 2 45 According to Chief Justice Marshall, whether an act
was properly allocated to the political branches or the judicial
branch "always depend[ed] on the nature of that act."'246 As to the
questions beyond the province of the judiciary, Marshall stated that
these "subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual
rights. 2 47 He further stated that "[t]he province of the court is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals. 248
Justice Marshall, therefore, believed that political questions
included judgments regarding the country's national interests as
opposed to judgments involving only individual rights.2 49 Though in
the oft-quoted statement from Marbury, Justice Marshall made
clear that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is,"25° he recognized that there were
some issues that, though they arise in the adjudicatory context,
require political judgments beyond the judicial realm. 1
2. Modern Approach to the Doctrine in Foreign Affairs Cases
Since Marshall's speech before Congress and his opinion in
Marbury, the political question doctrine has developed as a
constraint on judicial action in areas committed to the political
branches, especially in foreign relations.252 While the political
question doctrine is applicable in domestic cases, most often courts
apply it in cases involving foreign relations.253 In Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., the Supreme Court made the broad statement that
"[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is commit-
ted by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative--'the
political'-Departments of the Government, and the propriety of
245. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch), at 164.
246. Id. at 165.
247. Id. at 166.
248. Id. at 170.
249. Id. at 166.
250. Id. at 177.
251. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 250 (2002).
252. Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
253. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONSIJUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF
LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 4-5 (1992).
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what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
"1254
subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
Undoubtedly, questions involving foreign relations often require
the use of "standards that defy judicial application." '255 To determine
if a foreign relations question is beyond its reach, a court must look
to "the history of its management by the political branches, ... its
susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature and
posture in the specific case, and ... the possible consequences of
judicial action. 256 In Oetjen, the Court refused to determine the
validity of the confiscation of property by Mexican revolutionaries
who were ultimately successful in taking over the Mexican govern-
ment.2 7 Oetjen was based on the act of state doctrine, which is
discussed below. 258 But like the political question doctrine, the act
of state doctrine is also rooted in separation of powers principles. 9
In Baker v. Carr, the Court noted that there had been "sweeping
statements to the effect that all questions touching foreign relations
are political questions. 26 ° Cutting back somewhat on Oetjen's broad
language, the Baker Court cautioned that "it is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance. '261 The Court, nevertheless, reiterated
that there are certain classes of cases, including some foreign
relations cases, that require the resolution of issues that "turn on
standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a
discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legisla-
ture. 262 Many of those issues, Justice Brennan counseled, "uniquely
demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views. 263
Justice Brennan, in Baker v. Carr, provided the modern state-
ment of the political question doctrine, outlining the factors that
courts must consider when determining whether a question is
beyond the province of the judiciary and better suited for the
254. 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
255. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
256. Id. at 211-12.
257. See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 303.
258. See id. at 303-04.
259. See infra text accompanying notes 372-74.
260. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211 (citing Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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political branches.2" There must be a "discriminating analysis" of
the question presented, and the court must determine whether any
of the following factors dictate that the question is a political
question for the political branches: (1) "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department"; (2) "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving [the issue]"; (3) the "impossibility" of
resolving the issue absent an initial policy decision of the type
"clearly for nonjudicial discretion"; (4) the impossibility of resolution
without showing a "lack of the respect due coordinate branches"; (5)
''an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made"; and (6) the potential for "embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question." '' Even if only one of these factors is inextricable from a
case, there will be grounds for dismissal based on the presence of a
nonjusticiable political question.266
Justice Brennan provided examples of when courts should invoke
the political question doctrine. Though not all foreign relations cases
raise political questions, his examples reflect the discriminating
analysis necessary to determine whether the issues are appropriate
for judicial decision or involve the type of discretion more suited for
the political branches, demanding a single-voiced statement of the
U.S. government's views.2 67 For example, the Court noted that while
it would "not ordinarily inquire whether a treaty ha[d] been
terminated, ... if there ha[d] been no conclusive 'governmental
action,' ... [it would] construe a treaty and may find it provide[d] the
answer" to the question presented.26 In addition, while the
"recognition of foreign governments ... strongly defies judicial
treatment," once the Executive recognizes a nation's sovereignty
over an area, "courts may examine the resulting status and decide
independently whether a statute applies to that area. 269 Justice
Brennan also provided other examples of political questions: dates
264. See id. at 217.
265. Id. at 211, 217.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 211-12.
268. Id. at 212.
269. Id.
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and duration of hostilities, formalities of congressional enactments,
status of Indian tribes, and claims under the Guaranty Clause.27 °
Interestingly, though Justice Brennan solidified the applicability
of the political question doctrine with respect to foreign relations,
Baker v. Carr was a domestic case. In Baker, the Court found the
political question doctrine inapplicable to a challenge to a legislative
apportionment scheme in Tennessee.27' Even so, the Supreme Court
has since applied Baker in two foreign affairs cases. In one case, the
Court found the doctrine applicable to a challenge regarding the
training of a National Guard unit.272 In another case, a plurality of
the Court applied the doctrine to a case involving the President's
authority to terminate a treaty without Senate approval.273
Lower courts regularly apply the political question doctrine in
foreign affairs cases. Within the last few years, appellate and
district courts have invoked the political question doctrine in a
variety of foreign relations disputes: claims against Austria and its
instrumentalities for confiscation of property by the Nazis;274 claims
against Japan by women who claimed that they were forced into
sexual slavery during World War II;275 claims against the U.S.
government brought by children of a Chilean general claiming that
the United States helped kill him along with plotters of a Chilean
coup in 1970;276 claims by parties seeking to recover for forced labor
in German camps;277 and claims by landlords who had leased office
space to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
regarding the liability of successor states upon the Republic's
disintegration.278
270. Id. at 214-18.
271. Id. at 226.
272. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 8 (1973).
273. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998-1002 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
274. Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co. KG, 431 F.3d 57, 69-75 (2d Cir. 2005).
275. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 52-53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
276. Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 193-94 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
277. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 483-89 (D.N.J. 1999).
278. 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugo., 218 F.3d
152, 164 (2d Cir. 2000).
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3. Textual Support for the Doctrine
Whether the political question doctrine is constitutionally
mandated has been subject to some debate among scholars.
Professor Herbert Wechsler espoused the view that the only
legitimate reason for abstention in a case is that "the Constitution
has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of
government than the courts." '279 Professor Wechsler's view of the
political question doctrine was narrow; it is known as the "classical
version of the doctrine."2" On the other hand, Professor Alexander
Bickel argued that the political question doctrine was not constitu-
tionally mandated, but was "greatly more flexible, something of
prudence, not construction and not principle.""2 ' Professor Bickel
posited that "only by means of a play on words can the broad
discretion that the courts have in fact exercised be turned into an
act of constitutional interpretation. The political question doctrine
simply resists being domesticated in this fashion.""2 2
It seems, however, that Justice Marshall, who laid the foundation
for the political question doctrine, deemed it constitutionally
mandated. As in his speech before the House of Representatives," 3
in Marbury, Marshall emphasized the special role of the president
in foreign affairs. He noted that "[b]y the constitution of the United
States, the President is invested with certain important political
powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and
is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to
his own conscience."2 4 Therefore, despite arguments to the contrary,
the political question doctrine is rooted in the doctrine of separation
of powers. As one scholar has said, "[a]lthough its critics believe the
[political question] doctrine has no place in a country where judicial
review is a fundamental part of the constitutional structure, the
classical version of the political question doctrine can trace its
279. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 9 (1959).
280. Nzelibe, supra note 203, at 948-49.
281. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961).
282. Id.
283. See infra Part II.B.1.
284. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803).
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pedigree to the Constitution itself and its original understanding."285
Courts have also recognized "that 'the political question doctrine is
primarily a function of the separation of powers."'28 The text of the
Constitution commits areas involving foreign policymaking to the
political branches.287
Moreover, courts have found that the President has 'plenary and
exclusive power' in the international arena and 'as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations. '
Admittedly, the judiciary does have some power with respect to
foreign relations; but that power is limited to settling disputes in
cases presented to them in litigation that are within their jurisdic-
tional authority to hear. Specifically, under Article III, courts can
interpret and review the constitutionality of treaties and executive
agreements.289 They can also decide cases involving ambassadors,
foreign states and citizens, and consuls.2" Furthermore, courts have
the authority to interpret legislation that involves foreign affairs.
Still, courts have jurisdiction only to adjudicate cases involving such
disputes and have no authority for policymaking in the foreign
relations realm. As the D.C. Circuit recently put it, "[i]t cannot then
be denied that decision-making in the areas of foreign policy and
national security is textually committed to the political branches."29'
Courts cannot exercise their authority in a manner that encroaches
on the political branches' role with respect to foreign affairs and
they cannot use their judicial authority to aggrandize themselves.
285. Barkow, supra note 251, at 250 (footnote omitted).
286. Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 193 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)).
287. For example, the legislative branch, inter alia, has the power under Article I to
"provide for the common Defence ...; regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ...; define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations; ... declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal ...; (and] raise and support
Armies." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. But it is the executive that largely possesses control over
foreign affairs based on the textual commitments in Article II. Specifically, Article II provides,
inter alia, that the President is "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States," has the power "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties," and
can "appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
288. Schneider, 412 F.3d at 195 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
289. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
290. Id.
291. Schneider, 412 F.3d at 195 (emphasis added).
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In its recent political question cases, the Supreme Court seem-
ingly has merged the prudential Baker factors with its textual
commitment analysis.292 For example, the Supreme Court stated in
Nixon v. United States that "[a] controversy is nonjusticiable-i.e.,
involves a political question-where there is 'a textually demonstra-
ble constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it.' 293 But the Court explained that
the concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political
department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolv-
ing it; the lack of judicially manageable standards may
strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable
commitment to a coordinate branch. 94
Appellate courts have similarly merged the prudential Baker factors
with the textually committed analysis.295 The current scholarly
approach seems to recognize the merger of the classical and
prudential strains of the doctrine.296
C. Application of Separation of Powers Principles to the
International Due Process Analysis
The international due process concept that Judge Posner
conceptualized in Ashenden297 violates the separation of powers
because it requires federal courts to make foreign policy. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, only one of the Baker factors need
be established to raise separation of powers concerns in the
292. Nzelibe, supra note 203, at 952.
293. 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
294. Id. at 228-29.
295. See, e.g., 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugo.,
218 F.3d 152, 164 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Although prudential considerations may inform a court's
justiciability analysis, the political question doctrine is essentially a constitutional limitation
on the courts.").
296. See, e.g., Nzelibe, supra note 203, at 962 ("Strictly speaking, the notion that there may
be a prudential strain of the political question doctrine that is wholly distinct from the
constitutional strain no longer reflects the current state of the doctrine.").
297. See Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
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adjudication of a dispute.29 This Part focuses on the Baker factors
that are relevant to the international due process analysis: the lack
of institutional competence and judicially manageable standards,
and the potential to embarrass foreign relations. But as previously
discussed, these factors undergird the principle that foreign
policymaking is not in the province of the judiciary.299
1. Institutional Competence and Lack of Judicially Manageable
Standards
The international due process analysis essentially allows judges,
without any legal standards, to determine which countries' judg-
ments are worthy of enforcement without regard to the actual
proceedings in which the judgments were obtained. Such determina-
tions are typically embodied in bilateral and multilateral treaties.
For example, some time ago, European Union countries decided
which countries' judgments are to be recognized as a matter of law
by entering into a multilateral treaty, the Brussels Convention,
which for years governed recognition and enforcement of member
countries' judgments."' Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters, though it supersedes the Brussels
Convention, largely incorporated it into the regulation.30 ' The
United States has been unsuccessful in entering into any similar
treaties with other countries. 302 But under the international due
298. See, e.g., Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
299. See supra text accompanying notes 264-70.
300. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1968 O.J. (L 299) 32, amended by 1978 O.J. (L 304) 77
(accession of Denmark, Ireland, and United Kingdom), amended by 1982 O.J. (L 388) 1
(accession of Greece), amended by 1989 O.J. (L 285) 1 (accession of Spain and Portugal)
[hereinafter Brussels Convention].
301. See European Union Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Mar. 1, 2002, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, amended by,
2002 O.J. (L 225) 1. Council Regulation No. 44/2001 is binding on all European Union states,
with the exception of Denmark, where the Brussels Convention is still effective. Id.
302. See Recent International Agreement, Hague Conference Approves Uniform Rules of
Enforcement for International Forum Selection Clauses--Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements, Concluded June 30, 2005, 119 HARv L. REv. 931, 932 (2006) ("Although a United
Nations convention has successfully regulated enforcement of arbitral contracts and
agreements since 1958, the United States, unlike many European countries, is not yet a party
to any treaty regarding the enforcement of judgments." (footnotes omitted)).
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process analysis, courts are able to express the will of the United
States-or a federal judge's perception or misperception of that
will-in much the same way that an international treaty would. The
problem is that only the Executive has the authority to make
treaties, which must in turn be ratified by Congress. 303
In similar contexts, courts have recognized their lack of institu-
tional competence with respect to judging other countries. For
example, under the noninquiry rule, "courts refrain from 'investigat-
ing the fairness of a requesting nation's justice system,' and from
inquiring 'into the procedures or treatment which await a surren-
dered fugitive in the requesting country.""'3 4 Courts agree that the
rule of noninquiry "is shaped by concerns about institutional
competence and by notions of separation of powers."308 Some courts
have gone further, saying that the rule is constitutionally man-
dated. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has stated that "[u]ndergirding
this principle [of non-inquiry] is the notion that courts are ill-
equipped as institutions and ill-advised as a matter of separation
of powers and foreign relations policy to make inquiries into and
pronouncements about the workings of foreign countries' justice
systems."30 6 Moreover, courts have declared that the State
Department is better able to determine the foreign relations
consequences of nonextradition and can use its powers of diplomacy
to ensure that the extradited person receives a fair trial.0 7
Likewise, courts refuse to analyze a requesting country's reasons
for desiring extradition to determine if its real objective is to try the
defendant for political crimes.30 8 Those courts have based their
refusal to consider the requesting country's motivation on their own
lack of institutional competence and the potential for embarrass-
ment should the executive branch come to a different conclusion.3 9
303. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
304. United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)
(quoting Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983)).
305. Id.
306. In re Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 714 (9th Cir. 1995).
307. Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated as moot,
389 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2004).
308. Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, The Constitution, and the Rule of Non-inquiry
in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELLL. REv. 1198, 1238-39 (1991) (discussing
Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), and Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.
1986)).
309. Id. at 1238.
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Regarding the noninquiry rule, the "[s]crutiny of a foreign govern-
ment's investigative, legal, and penal systems for fairness and
humaneness is at least as intrusive as examining the motives
underlying a particular extradition request.""31 A determination
regarding another country's "fairness" and "humaneness" would
necessarily require that courts examine the "actual operation" of
and "honesty and integrity" of the requesting foreign government. 31
Courts have found that such determinations, in the extradition
context, are beyond the competency of the judiciary.
It is true that in the discretionary doctrine of forum non
conveniens, under which the court has the discretion to dismiss a
case even if it has jurisdiction and venue is proper, it is common to
list, as one of the factors in a dismissal, the availability and
adequacy of an alternative forum.312 To show availability, the
defendants have to establish that the foreign court can assert
jurisdiction over the case. 13 Courts also require defendants to
demonstrate adequacy by showing that the alternative forum can
provide some type of relief.314 But sometimes plaintiffs argue that
the alternative forum is inadequate because of extreme inefficiency,
impartiality, or corruption in the foreign judicial system. Courts
have expressed their reluctance to make such a finding, and refusal
to dismiss on these grounds is rare.315 As one judge stated, "the
argument that the alternative forum is too corrupt to be adequate
'does not enjoy a particularly impressive track record."'316 Ironically,
even the Second Circuit, which decided Pahlavi, has stated in the
forum non conveniens context that "considerations of comity
preclude a court from adversely judging the quality of a foreign
310. Id. at 1239.
311. Id. (quoting Eain, 641 F.2d at 516).
312. See Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006); In re
Bridgestone[Firestone, Inc., 420 F.3d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2005); Vasquez v. Bridgestone/
Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665,671-72 (5th Cir. 2003); PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal
Co., 138 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1998).
313. Leon v. Million Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Mercier v.
Sheraton Int'l, Inc., 935 F.2d 419, 425 (1st Cir. 1991)).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1311-12; see also PT United Can Co., 138 F.3d at 73 (noting that a finding that
the poor quality of a judicial system renders it an inadequate forum is uncommon).
316. Leon, 251 F.3d at 1311-12 (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078,
1084 (S.D. Fla. 1997)).
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justice system"31 and has repeatedly emphasized that "it is not the
business of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising
the integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation."3 '
At any rate, though courts should not be in the business of
judging the foreign judicial system in the forum non conveniens con-
text, there is a significant distinction between retaining jurisdiction
in a case, based on a finding of extreme corruption in the foreign
system, and refusing to recognize that judicial system's judg-
ments.319 The effect of finding a foreign system inadequate in the
forum non conveniens context is that the plaintiff will be able to
litigate the case in her chosen forum, a court in the United States.
The effect of a finding that a system is so fundamentally flawed that
its judgments are not worthy of recognition is a complete disregard
for that country's judicial decisions.
a. Highly Subjective Determination
Pahlavi, Bridgeway, and the Lloyd's cases reveal the wholly
subjective nature of the international due process standard.32 °
Depending on one's perspective, what happened to the Lloyd's
plaintiffs in the English courts was arguably "uncivilized." Cer-
tainly, many in this country-from legal scholars to members of
Congress-have expressed concern over the Lloyd's scandal and
have sympathized with the plight of the Names.32" ' In one of the
317. PT United Can Co., 138 F.3d at 73 (citing Flynn v. Gen. Motors, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 5, 9
(E.D.N.Y. 1992)).
318. Id. (quoting Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1991)).
319. See, e.g., Nzelibe, supra note 203, at 973-74 (arguing that courts lack the institutional
competency to distinguish between "liberal" and "non-liberal" countries in their application
of the political question doctrine and distinguishing the forum non conveniens analysis as a
"far cry" from the liberal/non-liberal distinction in political question cases).
320. See supra Part I.B-C.
321. See, e.g., Courtland H. Peterson, Choice of Law and Forum Clauses and the
Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments Revisited Through the Lloyd's of London Cases, 60
LA. L. REV. 1259, 1280 (2000) ("I have said some unkind things about Lloyd's, and they needed
to be said. But I cannot finish this essay without expressing real sorrow that the historic
institution of Lloyd's, as we knew it, with a rock solid reputation for solidity and integrity, has
come to such an ignominious end. Insurance is still sold in the Lloyd's market, to be sure, but
its reputation has been severely blackened and even its structure has changed."); see also
Letter from Sen. Mary Landrieu to Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary
(May 16, 2000), in 147 CONG. REC. S2323, S2355 (2001) ("We are writing you regarding an
issue of concern to a number of us on both sides of the aisle. As we understand it, you are
1210 [Vol. 48:1159
POLITICAL JUDGING
Lloyd's cases enforcing the British judgments, the Tenth Circuit
even cited its disapproval of Lloyd's actions, acknowledging that it
"[found] many of Lloyd's acts to be distinctly distasteful": '"There is
no question that the New Mexico and Utah Names suffered
substantial losses after investing in what had been, for three
centuries, a well-regarded institution. There is also no question that
Lloyd's was not forthcoming with all the information regarding its
substantial financial losses." '22 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit and
all of the courts who followed its analysis characterized the United
Kingdom as having a judiciary that is beyond reproach.32 The
Names would probably beg to differ. The fairness of a judicial
system is based on one's own biases and perspective. Moreover,
there is no judiciary or legal system that administers justice
flawlessly. So any pronouncement that a judicial or legal system is
fundamentally fair reflects at least some degree of overreaching.
Judicial systems are much more complex than any one label can
reflect. For example, in the criminal context, a common argument
of opponents of the death penalty in the United States is that the
system that administers capital punishment sends innocent people
to death row. In fact, "[slince 1973, more than 120 people have been
released from death row after being proven wrongfully convicted." '324
aware that English courts have entered summary judgments against hundreds of Americans
who contend that they were defrauded in the United States by Lloyd's of London. These
Americans were deprived of the right in these actions of raising a fraud defense to Lloyd's
claims. As a result, they have asked Congress to give them the right to raise their fraud
claims in any collection action brought by Lloyd's in the United States. They are merely
asking to have their day in court."); Letter from Rep. Henry Hyde to Sen. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations (Mar. 5, 2001), in 147 CONG. REC. S2355-56
(2001) ("As you are probably aware, a number of Members and Senators on both sides of the
aisle, as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission have endeavored to give the
Americans who believe they have been defrauded by Lloyd's legal forum in American courts
with respect to the representations that were made to them in this country by Lloyd's and its
agents"). Legislators sympathetic to the plight of the Names were unable to pass a provision
to a bankruptcy reform bill that would have relieved the American Names of their obligations
to pay the British judgments. 147 CONG. REc. S2351-52, 57.
322. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 993, 1005 (10th Cir. 2005).
323. Id. at 1005 ("We must respect the ample process afforded by the English system of
justice."); see also Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Siemon-Netto, 457 F.3d 94, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("The
Recognition Act ... requires proof that the 'judgment was rendered under a system that does
not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process
of law.' The defendants do not assert that English courts fall within that category and could
not prove it if they did." (citation omitted)).
324. Leonard Pitts, The Truth About Roger Coleman Hurts, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 18, 2006, at
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Many of those fortunate enough to be released have already spent
many years in prison.325 Do these failures in the criminal justice
system mean that the U.S. judicial system is, as a whole, fundamen-
tally flawed and unfair? The answer depends on whom you ask.
From the perspective of the innocent person who spent years of his
life behind bars, the answer is likely that the U.S. judicial system
is indeed fundamentally flawed. From the perspective of the
prosecutor, the answer is likely that the system is indeed fair, which
is why the innocent person was ultimately released.
Shifting to an example in the civil context, Congress recently
passed the Class Action Fairness Act. In passing this Act, Congress
found that for years many state courts had allowed and even
perpetuated abuses of the class action device and "undermined
public respect for our judicial system," showing bias against out-of-
state defendants."' To deal with recognized unfairness in state
court administration of class actions, the act effectively moved many
class action lawsuits to federal court. Congress, therefore, does not
even trust state courts to handle most class action lawsuits. What
does this congressional distrust of state courts say about the
fairness and impartiality of the judicial system in this country?
The point is that there are so many nuances within a judicial
system that no system is susceptible to one absolute label. Although
the international due process analysis provision, which the Ameri-
can Law Institute (ALI) retains in its proposed federal statute
dealing with foreign judgments, received relatively little attention
A7.
325. Sheridan Morley, Shocking Reality of Injustice and Death, DAILY EXPRESS (London),
Feb. 25, 2006, at 46 ("More than a thousand prisoners on Death Row across America have
been executed in the past 30 years, and the number of those awaiting execution currently
stands at 3,400.... Since 1973 more than 100 people have been released from Death Row after
it was shown they were wrongfully convicted.").
326. Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005). Congress found
that
Abuses in class actions undermine the National judicial system, the free flow of
interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the
framers of the United States constitution, in that State and local courts are-
(A) keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court;
(B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-
State defendants; and
(C) making judgments that impose their view of the law on other
States and bind the rights of the residents of those States.
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during the ALI's drafting process, at least one member expressed
concern regarding the breadth of a determination that an entire
country's system is fundamentally flawed."' Professor Gerhard
Casper noted that condemning an entire nation may not be appro-
priate in certain instances, though it may be acceptable to condemn
a particular region of the country:
I'm saying you cannot really, in the modern world, use a country.
You have to come up with a more flexible defintion of what you
mean by legal system. There is a countrywide system, there are
subsystems, this all is very complex, and the level of unfairness
can differ dramatically within the given country....32
As Professor Casper seemed to recognize, at least implicitly,
labeling an entire judicial system as fair or unfair, partial or
impartial, is unlikely to capture the true essence of the system. One
of the ALI reporters for the foreign judgments project, Professor
Andreas Lowenfeld, noted that judges might also be reluctant to
label an entire country as unfair: 'We wrestled with that. We find
judges very reluctant to say Ukraine has no fair justice. They might
say it for the ayatollahs and the mullahs in Iran; they would say it
about apartheid where you have black litigants; but perhaps not in
a commercial case ... 329
327. Discussion of Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Analysis and
Proposed Federal Statue, 82 A.L.I. PROC. 94 (2005). Specifically, Professor Gerhard Casper
stated:
You just talked about the safety valve provided by § 5, and of course one very
important one is § 5(a)(i), "the judgment was rendered under a system that does
not provide impartial tribunals," etc. So the big question becomes, how do you
define "system," and I have looked at Comments and at Reporters' Notes, and
I find really very little flash there, because it could be just a legal system as a
whole, but in reality, when we look at some of the troubles of countries we deal
with, the system as a whole may seem reasonable, but regional systems are in
terrible shape. You may be able to get justice in Bucharest but nowhere else in
Romania, and I think you need to spell out a little more how we define "system,"
because the alternative between your definition and more troublesome, more
local problems is that you are then really referred to subsection (a)(ii) about
circumstances of a particular court, and I think that is an unsatisfactory
outcome.
Id.
328. Id. (emphasis added).
329. Id.
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As the international due process cases demonstrate, labeling
countries as "good" or "bad" will only distract a judge from the real
issues in a judgment recognition case. For example, Judge Posner's
exaltation of the British judicial system masked the real issue in
Ashenden, which was whether U.S. courts should extend comity to
judgments that Lloyd's arguably obtained without due process. By
labeling the British system as fair, Posner never had to address in
any meaningful manner what actually happened to the Ashendens
and the other Names in the British court system. Judge Posner's
focus on the judicial system of the United Kingdom, essentially
labeling it a good system, skewed his entire analysis in Ashenden.
He touted the virtues of the United Kingdom's system and in the
same opinion gratuitously disparaged other judicial systems that
had absolutely no connection to the Ashenden case. In discrediting
the judicial systems of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Congo, and
uplifting the British judicial system, Judge Posner was able to shift
the focus of the case. He played on stereotypes about politically
disfavored countries to minimize the significance of the Lloyd's
scandal and the failures of the British courts with respect to that
scandal.
b. Retaliation Against Foreign Countries
The international due process analysis encourages courts to
retaliate against countries whose judicial and political systems are
not like our own. For example, Judge Posner listed Cuba, North
Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Congo as countries "whose adherence to the
rule of law and commitment to the norm of due process are open to
serious question" and whose judgments would likely not meet the
international due process standard.33 ° Of course, the United States
has for some time imposed economic sanctions on Cuba, only
recently permitting U.S. companies to trade food and agricultural
products with the country for cash.33' Also, around the time that the
Second Circuit decided Pahlavi, the United States had imposed
harsh economic sanctions on Iran.332 But such retaliatory measures
330. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
331. 22 U.S.C. § 7207(b)(1) (2000).
332. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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are strictly for the political branches to impose, and courts should
not use foreign judgment recognition to retaliate against a country
that is at odds politically with the United States.
In fact, many scholars and state legislatures have rejected the
reciprocity requirement for foreign judgment recognition and
enforcement because of its retaliatory policy. The reciprocity
requirement first surfaced in Hilton v. Guyot,"3 a the landmark
Supreme Court case upon which modern day foreign judgment
recognition law is based. Recall that in Hilton, the Supreme Court
refused to recognize a French judgment because, at the time, France
would not have recognized a similar judgment had it been obtained
in the United States. 4
In his dissent in Hilton, Justice Fuller criticized the majority for
adopting the reciprocity requirement and refusing to recognize the
French judgment. His criticism was based on separation of powers
principles.335 Justice Fuller argued that the French judgment should
have been recognized in accordance with domestic res judicata
principles instead of the discretionary doctrine of comity.
331
Specifically, he asserted that "[t]he application of the doctrine of res
judicata does not rest in discretion; and it is for the government,
and not for its courts, to adopt the principle of retorsion, if deemed
under any circumstances desirable or necessary.3 3 7
Retorsion is "[a]n act of lawful retaliation in kind for another
nation's unfriendly or unfair act. 338 Justice Fuller recognized that
retorsion is a political tool to be used by the political branches of
government. s As Justice Fuller saw it, reciprocity was unsound
because foreign judgment cases involved private rights:
333. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
334. Id. at 210.
335. Id. at 234 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 229 ("it seems to me that the doctrine of res judicata applicable to domestic
judgments should be applied to foreign judgments as well, and rests on the same general
ground of public policy that there should be an end of litigation.").
337. Id. at 234.
338. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1342 (8th ed. 2004) ("Examples of retorsion include
suspending diplomatic relations, expelling foreign nationals, and restricting travel rights.").
339. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 234 (Fuller, J., dissenting); see also Katherine R. Miller,
Playground Politics: Assessing the Wisdom of Writing a Reciprocity Requirement into U.S.
International Recognition and Enforcement Law, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 239, 303 (2004).
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In any aspect, it is difficult to see why rights acquired under
foreign judgments do not belong to the category of private rights
acquired under foreign laws. Now the rule is universal in this
country that private rights acquired under the laws of foreign
states will be respected and enforced in our courts unless
contrary to the policy or prejudicial to the interests of the state
where this is sought to be done; and although the source of this
rule may have been the comity characterizing the intercourse
between nations, it prevails to-day by its own strength, and the
right to the application of the law to which the particular
transaction is subject is a juridical right.34°
Justice Fuller's dissent aptly exposed a fundamental flaw in a
comity-based system of judgment recognition-the likelihood of
overreaching by the courts into foreign policymaking and the
resulting subordination of individual rights. He, therefore, argued
for the application of res judicata principles, applicable to domestic
judgments, to foreign judgments: 'This application of the doctrine
[of res judicata] is in accordance with our own jurisprudence, and it
is not necessary that we should hold it to be required by some rule
of international law. 341
Three other justices joined Justice Fuller's dissent,14 proving that
the comity-based rules for foreign judgment recognition that the
majority put forth in Hilton were not indubitable. Over one hundred
years after Hilton, the reciprocity requirement-which Justice
Fuller and three other justices considered a violation of the
separation of powers-still sparks intense debate among scholars.343
In fact, whether to include such a requirement was vigorously
debated within the ALI as it was drafting a proposed federal statute
dealing with foreign judgments. Indeed, the reciprocity issue was
the most controversial issue that arose during this project.3 44 Under
340. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 233 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 229.
342. Id. at 235.
343. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 339, at 316 (discussing the debate regarding reciprocity
and arguing that "[i]ncorporating reciprocity into U.S. judicial practice, contrary to the
'wishful thinking' of those arguing in favor of a reciprocity provision, will result in negative
secondary effects on U.S. judgments abroad, U.S. interests in general, and the international
legal order" (footnote omitted)).
344. See RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND
PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 7(a) (Proposed Final Draft 2005) [hereinafter ALl PROPOSED
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the final draft of the proposed statute, federal courts are required to
determine whether a country affords recognition to U.S. courts and
refuse recognition if they find that "comparable judgments of courts
in the United States would not be recognized or enforced in the
courts of the state of origin."'
Prior to the adoption of its final draft, one scholar discussed the
separation of powers problem inherent in the ALI's reciprocity
requirement:
Given the political nature of the reciprocity doctrine, as well
as its administrative difficulties, courts are not proper forums
for application of its principles. Reciprocity-as a subset of
retorsion-is a diplomatic matter, affecting relations between
two countries' courts, and therefore, if appropriate at all, "may
be more appropriately pursued by governmental institutions
vested with the power to guide foreign relations and make
international agreements."346
As Justice Fuller aptly pointed out with respect to the reciprocity
requirement, courts also lack the institutional competence to pass
judgment on the fairness of another country's judicial or political
system.347
c. Rewarding Foreign Countries
Just as courts lack the institutional authority to retaliate against
other countries, they also lack the authority to reward foreign
FINAL DRAFr]; Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade of Parallel Proceedings
and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Transnational Litigation, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 1, 5-6 n.20 (2004) ('The reciprocity requirement is controversial. It was the focus of
much debate at the May 2004 ALI meeting, where a motion to delete the reciprocity portion
of section 7 failed."); Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating
Party Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMp. L. 543, 547 n.23
(2005) ('The ALI proposed statute has a more direct effect on the export of judgments by
requiring reciprocity for enforcement, a very controversial issue before the ALI membership.");
see also Discussion of International Jurisdiction and Judgments Project, 81 A.L.I. PROC. 74
(2004) (quoting Director Lance Liebman who noted that the issue of reciprocity "continues to
divide serious people in the audience.").
345. ALI PROPOSED FINAL DRAFr, supra note 344, § 7(a).
346. Miller, supra note 339, at 303 (citation and footnotes omitted) (quoting Michael D.
Ramsey, Escaping "International Comity," 83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 913 (1998)).
347. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 234 (1895) (Fuller, J., dissenting).
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countries-by recognizing their judgments-because their political
and judicial systems resemble those of the United States or because
they strive to emulate the United States. Yet the international due
process analysis encourages courts to do just that. For example, in
S.C. Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enterprises Ltd.,348 a case involving a
judgment obtained under the "reformed" Romanian judicial system,
the court praised Romania for its reform efforts and seemed to
reward those efforts by recognizing the judgment. While the court's
analysis was ostensibly about the fairness of the country's judicial
system, it actually turned more on an in depth examination of the
country's political regime. Absent from the court's analysis was any
real legal standard for assessing the fairness of the judiciary.
In S.C. Chimexim, a district court enforced a judgment by a
Romanian court.34s The judgment creditor obtained the judgment in
1996, and the judgment became final after the last appeal in 1999.350
From a historical perspective, the judgment debtor obtained the
judgment just a few years after the ousting of the communist regime
in Romania.35' In assessing the system from which the judgment
originated, the court detailed Romania's political history from the
Communists' takeover in 1947 to the uprising against the Commu-
nist regime and the ousting and execution of President Nicolae
Ceausescu." 2 The court further detailed the May 1990 multiparty
election in which "Iliescu was elected president, and his party, the
National Liberation Front ..., gained control of the legislature. 353
Regarding the adoption of the Romanian Constitution, the court
said:
In December 1991, a new constitution was approved by
popular referendum. The constitution declared Romania to be a
348. 36 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
349. Id. at 216. After the district court's decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of Romania
vacated the judgment and remanded the case to a lower court for further proceedings. S.C.
Chimexim S.A. v. Velco Enter., Ltd., No. 98 Civ. 0142(DC), 2004 WL 330233, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 23, 2004). Ultimately the Romanian court again entered judgment in favor of Chimexim,
and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York again enforced the
Romanian judgment "[flor all the reasons stated in the [1999] Opinion." Id. Therefore, the
court's analysis of the 1999 opinion will be discussed here.
350. S.C. Chimexim S.A., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
351. Id. at 208.
352. Id.
353. Id.
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parliamentary republic and provided for multiple political
parties, a separation of powers between branches of government,
a market economy, and respect for human rights. Romanian
military, police, and intelligence structures eventually were put
under civilian control.354
The district court also noted the progression of the new government
since the revolution. 35 5 According to the court, in 1996,
[t]he coalition that had been in power since the revolution was
voted out and replaced by a "new reform-minded Prime Minis-
ter." The new government "is implementing a very ambitious
and aggressive economic program aimed at a rapid culmination
of privatization and restructuring of the Romanian economy."
Recent new laws include an "Emergency Ordinance" that seeks
to encourage investment in Romania by establishing certain
protections for foreign investors, a Copyright Law that is
designed to conform to the standards of the Berne Convention
and the World Trade Organization, and tax laws intended to
help Romania adapt to a free market economy.
356
To a lesser extent, the court also evaluated the Romanian judiciary
under the new government. The court found that during the
communist regime, "individual justice was subservient to the state's
goal of creating a communist society, and judges were merely
instruments of the state."3 57 But after the overthrow of the commu-
nist regime, the judiciary "underwent significant reform."35 The
court found it important that the current Romanian Constitution
provided for an independent judiciary with "three levels of courts
beneath the Supreme Court. ' 35 9 The court also found it significant
that the Romanian judges are "typically selected from among the
most outstanding recent graduates of the law schools."" °
354. Id.
355. See id.
356. Id. (citations omitted).
357. Id. (quoting AM. BAR ASS'N CENT. & E. EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE, JUDICIAL OVERVIEW
OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 1 (1996)).
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. (quoting AM. BAR ASS'N CENT. & E. EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE, JUDICIAL OVERVIEW
OF CENTRALAND EASTERN EUROPE 4-5 (1996)).
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The S.C. Chimexim opinion is laden with politically charged
language. The court's findings with respect to Romania's system
reveal that the true inquiry under an international due process
inquiry will be, "[a]re the foreign country's political values similar
to the United States?" Though Romania was once a communist
country, the court rewarded the country through the recognition of
its judgments because of its "significant reform. 3 61
The court's recognition of the judgment also signaled approval of
Romania's "ambitious and aggressive" plan for its economy, which
"aimed at a rapid culmination of privatization," and, among other
things, its adoption of "tax laws intended to help Romania adapt to
a free market economy., 362 I am not arguing that the findings are
inaccurate. I am arguing, however, that such findings should have
nothing to do with whether an American judge will enforce a foreign
court's judgment. The findings are politically charged-the type of
findings that the executive or legislative branches typically make.
2. Potential To Embarrass
It may at first blush seem appropriate to condemn the countries
that Judge Posner listed as having systems whose adherence to the
rule of law are doubtful and that the courts in Bridgeway and
Pahlavi condemned. Those countries-Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Congo,
North Korea, and Libera-are notorious for their conflicts within
and outside of their borders, and particularly because of their
political conflicts with the United States. But condemnation of any
country by federal or state courts could embarrass the executive
branch in conducting relations with those countries.
Indeed, some time ago, Professors Arthur T. von Mehren and
Donald T. Trautman made this very point, though somewhat
cursorily, in an article surveying approaches to foreign judgment
recognition.363 They published their article in 1968, not long after
NCCUSL completed the Uniform Act. In their article, Professors von
Mehren and Trautman briefly addressed the due process provision
361. See id.; see also supra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
362. S.C. Chimexim, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 208.
363. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications:
A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1662 (1968).
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in the Uniform Act.3"4 Their article is one of the few articles that
address this exception at all, other than in passing. After arguing
that the utilization of a reciprocity requirement "would normally be
more effective and be considered more appropriate as a specific
executive or legislative determination," they turned to the due
process exception. 6
Professors von Mehren and Trautman argued that "[t]he problem
of what areas of recognition practice should be left to the legislative
and executive departments is even more acute in connection with a
challenge to the fairness and adequacy of a legal system's proce-
dural arrangements in general." '366 They noted that such a judgment
would raise questions about all judgments arising under that legal
system.367 Such an attack "might embarrass international relations
even if unsuccessful."3 8 Moreover, they questioned "whether
individual courts should be entrusted with a determination having
such serious political implications. '369
At the time that they wrote their article, such attacks on a
judicial system were rare. Nor had any such attack been successful.
Today, however, such attacks are no longer rare. Though litigants
are often unsuccessful in their arguments, Pahlavi and Bridgeway
signal that courts will entertain these attacks and condemn an
entire judicial system. Moreover, Ashenden and the other Lloyd's
cases further signal that courts are willing to entertain and uphold
such attacks and even create their own lists of countries from which
they will not accept judgments. More troubling, under the rule that
the courts in Ashenden and the other Lloyd's cases adopted, is that
courts will uphold judgments based on a judge's subjective percep-
tion of the fairness of the foreign judicial system despite due process
violations in individual proceedings of that foreign court.
As Professors von Mehren and Trautman aptly observed, the
international due process concept can affect foreign relations and
embarrass the executive branch.37 ° First, as a general matter,
364. See id. at 1662-63 & n.199.
365. Id. at 1662.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. (emphasis added).
369. Id. at 1663.
370. See id. at 1662.
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foreign judgment recognition is an aspect of the United States's
foreign relations with other countries, and scholars have recognized
this basic premise.37 A published judicial opinion that expressly
condemns a country's judicial system has the potential to affect
adversely any negotiations regarding that country in which the
executive might be involved. Indeed, part of the impetus for the
ALI's proposed federal statute is that foreign judgment recognition
affects foreign relations with other countries, and thus, the nation
should speak uniformly regarding the standards for recognizing
such judgments.
The potential to embarrass the executive in the conduct of foreign
relations is a major underpinning of the act of state doctrine, a close
cousin to the political question doctrine. Under the act of state
doctrine, courts "generally refrain from judging the acts of a foreign
state within its territory." '72 Courts, therefore, will not judge the
legality of acts by foreign officials. For example, in the seminal act
of state doctrine case, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the
Supreme Court declined to adjudicate the legality of the expropria-
tion of American assets in Cuba by a Cuban instrumentality.373 The
Court found that inquiring into the validity of this expropriation
could potentially embarrass the executive in conducting foreign
relations.374
In some respects, the outright refusal to enforce the judgments of
another country, because of a judicial determination that the
country's judicial and political system is fundamentally unfair or
even uncivilized, is far more troubling than a decision in a particu-
lar case that a foreign official acted unlawfully. A finding that an
entire country's judicial system is fundamentally flawed is far
broader than a judgment regarding a particular act of the govern-
371. See ALI PROPOSED FINAL DRAFr, supra note 344, at 1. This draft states that
[j]ust as the recognition or enforcement of an American judgment in France or
Italy is an aspect of the relation between the United States and the country
where recognition or enforcement is sought, so a foreign judgment presented in
the United States for recognition or enforcement is an aspect of the relation
between the United States and the foreign state, even if the particular
controversy that resulted in the foreign judgment involves only private parties.
Id. (emphasis added).
372. Kadic v. Karadik, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)).
373. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 439.
374. Id. at 433.
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ment. The international due process analysis permits a wholesale
condemnation of a country's government. Such a finding says to the
world that, in the view of the United States, that country is
unworthy of acceptance in civilized society.
Though the legal effect of a court's refusal to recognize the foreign
judgment usually will not directly involve the foreign sovereign, the
rationale for the court's decision would directly affect the foreign
sovereign's relations with the United States. More specifically, the
court's findings in its assessment of the foreign country would
directly affect that country's relations with the United States.
This conclusion, that the international due process analysis
violates the separation of powers, does not mean that courts should
decline altogether to decide due process challenges raised by
litigants in defense of foreign judgment recognition. Nor does it
suggest that it is desirable for courts to recognize and enforce
judgments from countries that wholly fail to provide for procedures
compatible with due process of law-if such countries do, in fact,
exist. Courts should, however, limit their analysis of foreign
judgments, assessing whether the individual proceedings from
which judgments originated afforded the litigants due process.
III. RESHAPING THE DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS FOR FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS
Any finding that a foreign country's judicial and political systems
are so fundamentally flawed that they do not provide for impartial
tribunals or fair procedures is inherently political: the international
due process analysis is not a legal determination at all. In reality,
and as the cases demonstrate, the countries that have and will fail
international due process scrutiny are countries that courts perceive
as politically disfavored countries-outcasts in the "civilized" world.
Conversely, countries that courts perceive as politically favored will
pass due process scrutiny even if the individual proceedings at issue
failed to afford due process.
This Part proposes an international due process analysis in which
courts will not judge the entire political systems of the foreign
country but will narrow their focus to the individual proceedings in
which the judgment was rendered. First, it outlines the contours of
a procedural due process analysis that does not judge the country
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but judges the individual proceedings. It draws on analogous
examples wherein courts apply due process analyses in enforcing
arbitration awards and tribal judgments. Next, it briefly looks at
projects by the ALI and NCCUSL that deal with foreign judgment
recognition, and demonstrates their failure to address the interna-
tional due process problem. This Part then addresses arguments
from some scholars that American constitutional standards should
not be "exported" in the area of foreign judgment recognition. This
Part deals in particular with cases that presented substantive
objections to foreign law. Specifically, it discusses the free
speech/foreign judgment cases in which courts have applied
American constitutional standards and which some scholars have
criticized. It then argues that courts cannot, under the state action
doctrine, recognize foreign judgments that are unconstitutional.
Lastly, this Part addresses the substantive due process problem
that Ashenden raised and argues that the state action doctrine
requires that there also be a substantive component of the interna-
tional due process analysis.
A. How Much Process Is Due?
Because the international due process analysis requires courts to
engage in international politics, which can adversely affect U.S.
foreign relations and individual rights, courts should consider the
particulars of the foreign proceedings when a judgment debtor
raises a due process defense to recognition. Courts should not focus
on the overall system from which the judgment originated. Of
course, if the executive branch believes that a foreign country's
judgments are not worthy of recognition, it can clearly state this.
Indeed, the State Department could maintain a list of countries
from which judgments will not be enforceable in the United States
because, in the view of the executive branch, those countries'
judicial and political systems are inadequate. This list could be
similar to the terrorist country list that the State Department
currently maintains." 5 If a country is on the list, then the
375. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d) (2006) (listing Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and
Syria as countries that have "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism"
and stating that exports to those countries are "contrary to the foreign policy of the United
States").
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courts simply will not enforce that country's judgments; but if the
executive branch has not said that a country's judgments are
unenforceable, courts must consider whether the court in the foreign
proceedings at issue afforded the litigants due process in those
proceedings.
In the United States, the most fundamental requirement of
procedural due process is "the opportunity to be heard 'at a mean-
ingful time and in a meaningful manner.', 7 6 The international due
process analysis refuses judgment debtors the right to raise the
denial of this most basic right as a defense to foreign judgment
recognition, instead focusing on the overall fairness of a judicial
system. In Ashenden, Judge Posner stressed the difficulty of
employing a "retail approach" to due process, or in other words,
looking beyond the fairness of the overall judicial system of a
particular country. 77 He expressed doubt that any one country had
adopted our "complex" concept of due process or conformed its
procedural doctrines to each of the latest twists and turns of
American due process jurisprudence.37 As Part III demonstrated,
however, the international due process analysis requires judges to
engage in international politics. Indeed, Judge Posner said that the
international due process concept refers to the "concept of fair
procedure simple and basic enough to describe the judicial processes
of civilized nations, our peers. '3 79 This analysis allows judges simply
to choose which countries they deem "civilized" and "peers" and
enforce their judgments with no regard for whether particular
proceedings afforded the individual litigants due process. The
international due process analysis is constitutionally deficient.
The argument that it is too difficult to apply "complex" American
notions of due process in foreign judgment recognition cases is
specious. In analogous enforcement cases, courts apply American
standards of due process to the particular proceedings from which
the judgment came. For example, in International Transactions,
Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana, the Fifth Circuit
refused to extend comity and recognize a Mexican bankruptcy order
376. City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 717 (2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
377. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
378. Id.
379. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
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because there had not been adequate notice of the proceedings. The
Fifth Circuit, which followed Ashenden's international due process
analysis in Society of Lloyd's v. Turner the year before, stated:
"Notice is an element of our notion of due process and the United
States will not enforce a judgment obtained without the bare
minimum requirements of notice."380 The Fifth Circuit cited and
applied Hilton's comity principles as well as U.S. due process cases
and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in concluding that the Mexican order
violated due process and was entitled to no effect in the United
States."'
Similarly in other enforcement contexts, courts apply American
notions of due process to the particular foreign proceedings. For
example under the New York Convention, the party against whom
an arbitral award is invoked has a right to raise a due process
defense." 2 Specifically, the convention states that the award is not
enforceable if "[tjhe party against whom the award is invoked was
not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the
arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his
case."3 3 Courts have interpreted this provision to mean that the
enforcing court is to apply its country's concept of due process.8 4 In
applying American notions of due process to arbitral award
enforcement cases, courts have looked at the particular arbitration
proceedings to determine if the objecting party was afforded "the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."
38 5
380. Int'l Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana, SA de CV, 347 F.3d
589, 594 (5th Cir. 2003).
381. Id.
382. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].
383. Id. at art. V(1)(b) (emphasis added).
384. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); see also Ashenden, 233 F.3d
at 477 (noting that the due process provision in the New York Convention "has been
interpreted to mean the enforcing jurisdiction's concept of due process"); Iran Aircraft Indus.
v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing that this provision of the
Convention '"essentially sanctions the application of the forum state's standards of due
process,' and that due process rights are 'entitled to full force under the Convention as
defenses to enforcement. Under our law '[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner."' (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added) (alteration in original)).
385. Iran Aircraft Indus., 980 F.2d at 146 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (1976)).
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Judge Posner even recognized in Ashenden that his international
concept of due process was far less rigorous than the test that courts
use in deciding whether to enforce arbitral awards under the New
York Convention.38 Indeed, in Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical
Basics, Inc., Judge Posner's colleagues on the Seventh Circuit stated
that an arbitrator clearly must provide a fundamentally fair hearing
and that 'the minimal requirements of fairness' [are] adequate
notice, a hearing on the evidence, and an impartial decision by the
arbitrator." '387 Thus, even given the significant differences between
arbitration proceedings and judicial proceedings, courts have been
able to formulate and apply a due process analysis.
In Iran Aircraft Industries v. Avco Corp., the Second Circuit
refused to recognize an arbitral award for over $3 million that the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal awarded in favor of Iranian
agencies and instrumentalities and against Avco Corporation.3"8
Relying on the due process provision in the New York Convention,
Avco argued that the Tribunal did not afford it an opportunity to
present its case.389 Specifically, one of the arbitrators informed
Avco's counsel at a prehearing conference that it did not have to
produce actual invoices to substantiate its claims, but could rely on
audited accounts receivable ledgers.9 But later, at the hearing on
the matter, the Tribunal rejected Avco's claims for failure to produce
the actual invoices.39' The Second Circuit refused to recognize the
arbitral award, finding that the Tribunal misled Avco and "denied
[the company] the opportunity to present its claim in a meaningful
manner." '392 Like the Second Circuit, other courts enforcing arbitra-
tion awards have had no difficulty in looking at the particular
arbitration proceedings to determine whether due process was
afforded.393
386. Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477.
387. Generica Ltd. v. Pharm. Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 823 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987)).
388. Iran Aircraft Indus., 980 F.2d at 142.
389. Id. at 145.
390. Id. at 146.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. See, e.g., Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyat Dam Gas Bumi
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 298-99 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that under the New York Convention,
a foreign arbitral award may be denied if obtained in violation of U.S. notions of due process);
Generica Ltd. v. Pharm. Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, 1129-30 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[Ain arbitral
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Similarly, in the context of tribal judgments, courts have also
considered the fairness of the individual proceedings. Relying on
Hilton, courts have repeatedly stated that they will not recognize
tribal judgments if the tribal courts failed to afford the defendant
due process.394 As with foreign country judgments, the tribal
judgment recognition cases also follow Hilton's comity analysis. 95
In other words, they treat the tribal judgments as "foreign judg-
ments." '396
Remarkably, courts that refused to consider the particulars of the
British proceedings in the Lloyd's cases have considered the
particulars of tribal judgments.397 For example, in Bird v. Glacier
Electric Cooperative, Inc., the Ninth Circuit applied Hilton and
refused to enforce a judgment from a tribal court, finding that the
judgment creditor's closing argument "offended fundamental
fairness and violated due process" by appealing to racial bias,39 even
though the judgment debtor failed to object in the tribal proceedings
or move for a new trial.399 According to the court, the plaintiffs
argument "link[ed] the [defendant's] behavior to white racism in
exploitation of Indians."4 ° Applying a plain error analysis because
of the failure to object, the court considered whether the appeal to
racial prejudice in the closing argument violated due process." 1 The
court found that the argument was "irrelevant and unfair" to the
defendant and deprived the defendant of a "fair proceeding.
40 2
So why should courts refuse to look to the individual fairness of
foreign country judgments? Judge Posner and other judges applying
award should be denied or vacated if the party challenging the award proves that he was not
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard as our due process jurisprudence defines it.").
394. See MacArthur v. San Juan County, 309 F.3d 1216, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that
federal courts will not enforce tribal judgments rendered without due process); Bird v. Glacier
Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[O]ur precedents make clear that a
district court cannot properly give comity to a tribal court judgment if the tribal court
proceedings violated due process."); Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 1997)
(noting that federal courts must not enforce tribal judgments if "the defendant was not
afforded due process of law").
395. See Marchington, 127 F.3d at 810.
396. Id.
397. See supra note 394.
398. Bird, 255 F.3d at 1151-52.
399. Id. at 1150.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 1148-52.
402. Id. at 1152.
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the international due process analysis make much of the complexity
of American due process jurisprudence. But as the other enforce-
ment cases discussed above demonstrate, there really is no such
difficulty. Indeed the balancing test that the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge outlined for addressing procedural due process
claims is not at all difficult to apply.4 °3 The Court has said that
"Mathews dictates that the process due in any given instance is
determined by weighing 'the private interest that will be affected by
the official action' against the Government's asserted interest,
'including the function involved' and the burdens the Government
would face in providing greater process."4 °4 According to the Court,
"The Mathews calculus then contemplates a judicious balancing of
these concerns, through an analysis of 'the risk of an erroneous
deprivation' of the private interest if the process were reduced and
the 'probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards."'4 5 An American court could easily apply this test to
foreign proceedings. Proponents of international due process also
assert that applying American standards of due process will not
account for differences between the American judicial system and
many foreign systems. Many foreign judicial systems, for example,
do not have jury trials or do not permit cross-examination of certain
witnesses; but American due process standards can account for such
differences in procedural systems. In fact, the Supreme Court in
Hilton contemplated a due process analysis that would involve an
individualized assessment of the foreign proceedings to determine
if they were fundamentally fair. The Court said that, in the foreign
proceedings, there must have been "opportunity for a full and fair
trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the
trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant."4 °6 The Court said that challenges
based on the absence of cross-examination and unsworn testimony
were inadequate bases for finding that the foreign proceedings
failed to afford due process.4"7 But Hilton never advocated turning
a blind eye to the fairness of the individual proceedings.
403. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
404. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
405. Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
406. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895).
407. Id. at 204-05.
2007] 1229
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Shortly after Hilton, in Banco Minero v. Ross, the Texas Supreme
Court noted that "the chief requisite for the recognition of a foreign
judgment necessarily is that an opportunity for a full and fair trial
was afforded."4 8 The court found that the Mexican proceedings at
issue were "wanting in these essential elements."40 9 According to the
court, the judgment debtor pleaded "a good defense, yet ... he was
denied the right to present it, it not appearing that his offer to
support it was unseasonably made."41 The court further noted that
the Mexican court issued the judgment "upon no proof whatever,"41'
and the judgment debtor was denied an appeal on a "frivolous
ground." '412 The court, therefore, refused to recognize the Mexican
judgment.4"3
At its core, this basic requirement of due process is not difficult
to apply to foreign proceedings at all, especially to the foreign
judgments of "our peers."4 '4 Hilton envisioned the application of the
American concept of due process, at its most fundamental
level-notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.4"5 In fact,
the district court in Ashenden had no trouble applying American
notions of due process. The court did not interpret Hilton and the
Uniform Act as preventing it from considering whether the British
courts had given the Ashendens a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.4"6 The district court found that the British courts had not
afforded the Ashendens this opportunity, and that the British courts
had not provided the Ashendens with a predeprivation hearing.417
As the Supreme Court has said, "We must bear in mind that no
single model of procedural fairness, let alone a particular form of
procedure, is dictated by the Due Process Clause. 'The very nature
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures univer-
sally applicable to every imaginable situation."'4 " The amount of
408. 172 S.W. 711, 714 (Tex. 1915).
409. Id. at 715.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
415. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166-67 (1895).
416. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, No. 98 C 5335, 1999 WL 284775, at **5-6 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
23, 1999).
417. Id. at *7.
418. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483 (1982) (quoting Mitchell v. W.T.
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process due truly depends on the circumstances of the individual
case. As Hilton instructed, in determining whether notice is
adequate and whether there is meaningful opportunity to be heard,
courts can take into account differences in the foreign legal system.
Again pointing to the tribal context, courts have held that
divergence from common law procedures is not a per se violation of
due process.419 In adjudicating matters involving Indian tribes,
courts note that they must interpret the due process requirements
of the Constitution in a manner that is still respectful of Indian
customs and differences in Indian procedures.420 For example, in
Indian Political Action Committee v. Tribal Executive Committee of
the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, the court took into account Indian
customs and differences in procedure in defining the contours of due
process.421 In that case, the plaintiffs challenged elections that had
been held on a reservation in Minnesota. 2 The plaintiffs also
claimed that they had been denied due process in the consideration
of their protests at a tribal town meeting held by the Tribal
Executive Committee (TEC).423 The court found that "[t]he 'town
meeting' type hearing which was employed by the TEC is the
traditional form of tribal hearing and must be measured by the
general standard of fundamental fairness." '424 The court also found
that the meeting comported with fundamental fairness:
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974)).
419. See, e.g., Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136,1142 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Comity
does not require that a tribe utilize judicial procedures identical to those used in the United
States Courts. Foreign-law notions are not per se disharmonious with due process by reason
of their divergence from the common-law notions of procedure." (quoting Wilson v.
Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1997))); Marchington, 127 F.3d at 811 ("Federal
courts must also be careful to respect tribal jurisprudence along with the special customs and
practical limitations of tribal court systems. Extending comity to tribal judgments is not an
invitation for the federal courts to exercise unnecessary judicial paternalism in derogation of
tribal self-governance. However, the tribal court proceedings must afford the defendant the
basic tenets of due process ...."); MacArthur v. San Juan County, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1315
(D. Utah 2005) (noting that courts will not enforce tribal judgments if the tribal court did not
afford the defendant due process).
420. See, e.g., Randall v. Yakima Nation Tribal Court, 841 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1988)
(noting that "courts have been careful to construe the term 0 due process ... with due regard
for the historical, governmental and cultural values of an Indian tribe" (alteration in original)
(quoting Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1104 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976))).
421. 416 F. Supp. 655, 658-59 (D. Minn. 1976).
422. Id. at 656.
423. Id. at 659-60.
424. Id. at 659.
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All of the protests in all of the elections in issue were heard by
the TEC at an open meeting. All who cared to present evidence
or argument were allowed to do so. No formal subpoenas or
invitations to testify were issued, but all tribe members had
notice of the meeting and were given the opportunity to speak....
This court refuses to hold that this time-honored and customary
procedure employed by the TEC is so lacking in fundamental
fairness as to constitute a denial of due process. All members of
the tribe had notice of the meeting, and all who came were given
the opportunity to be heard. No fairer procedure could exist.425
Accordingly, a foreign judgment violates procedural due process
only if the differences in the foreign proceedings are such that the
judgment debtor did not receive adequate notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Such a finding does not require an
assessment of the politics of the foreign country or pass judgment on
the foreign country: it is a legal determination.
Courts following the international due process analysis also raise
an argument based on judicial economy. For example, in Ashenden,
Judge Posner said:
The statute, with its reference to "system," does not support
such a retail approach, which would moreover be inconsistent
with providing a streamlined, expeditious method for collecting
money judgments rendered by courts in other jurisdictions-
which would in effect give the judgment creditor a further
appeal on the merits. The process of collecting a judgment is not
meant to require a second lawsuit.... 426
Even assuming that it would be onerous for a court to consider the
particulars of the foreign proceedings, which courts already do in
arbitration cases and tribal cases, the proceedings in Bridgeway
belie the argument that the international due process analysis
promotes judicial economy. Recall that in Bridgeway, after the court
condemned the Liberian judicial system and refused to recognize
the Liberian judgment, it allowed the plaintiff to litigate fully the
underlying claims. In other words, the court disregarded the
425. Id.
426. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Liberian judgment and allowed a second trial on the same claims
that the Liberian court had adjudicated.427 On closer examination,
the judicial economy argument applies only with respect to judg-
ments from "our peers."42 At any rate, the rationale is insufficient
to justify a court's refusal to consider, in recognition proceedings,
due process challenges to the foreign court proceedings.
It is important to remember that foreign judgment recognition in
this country is based on principles of comity, and the international
due process standard ignores aspects of the comity doctrine on
which foreign judgment recognition is based. The comity doctrine
was originally meant to take into account the interests of the
individual, in addition to the interests of the enforcing country
and the interests of the foreign country. The individual interests
included due process rights to fairness in the foreign proceedings. In
Hilton, the Court stated that comity requires that courts give "due
regard" to the rights of its own citizens.42
B. ALI and NCCUSL Projects and Due Process
The ALI recently completed a six-year project on the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments. The project culminated in a
proposed federal statute, which aims to achieve uniformity and a
national approach to foreign judgment recognition.43 ° The ALI will
soon present this proposed statute to Congress.
The ALI's proposed federal statute is similar to the Uniform Act
with respect to most of its limitations on the recognition of foreign
judgments. With respect to due process, the ALI follows the current
practice of courts, as exemplified in the Lloyd's cases, of imposing a
concept of international due process.43' In fact, the commentary to
the draft discusses and approves of Judge Posner's opinion in
Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden.43' The commentary states, in part,
that "[a] showing that the judgment debtor was not dealt with fairly
in the particular case will not defeat recognition or enforcement ....
427. Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 2000).
428. Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477.
429. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
430. See ALI PROPOSED FINAL DRAFr, supra note 344.
431. See id. § 5.
432. See id. § 5 cmt. c.
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[F]or a judgment to be enforceable, the procedures undertaken in
the foreign court must have been fair in the broader international
sense."433 The ALI also added a new mandatory exception to
recognition, which deals with corruption in the forum court.43 4 This
exception states that a judgment shall not be recognized if "the
judgment was rendered in circumstances that raise substantial and
justifiable doubt about the integrity of the rendering court with
respect to the judgment in question."435 Thus, a judgment debtor
might be able to raise due process violations based on its individual
proceedings, but only in the context of establishing corruption of the
foreign judge. The commentary states that to satisfy his burden, the
judgment debtor must show "corruption in the particular case and
its probable impact on the judgment in question. 436
The ALI's draft statute does not go far enough to protect judg-
ment debtors, often American citizens, from due process violations.
In fact, by eliminating the phrase "due process" from its draft, the
ALI embraces the notion that American constitutional guarantees
are inapplicable in foreign judgment recognition proceedings.
Perhaps recognizing that corruption of individual judges in
foreign countries is a problem that American judgment debtors
have faced in foreign courts, the ALI rightly concluded that,
where such corruption can be proven, it must serve as ground for
nonrecognition.437 Presently, judgment debtors have no defense to
recognition of judgments obtained in proceedings in which the
judges were corrupt,438 but the ALI's draft simply does not go far
enough with respect to due process.
The revised Uniform Act still contains the provision on which the
international due process provision is based. 439 Thus, NCCUSL still
approves of courts engaging in a systemwide analysis of foreign
countries. The Uniform Act still does not require courts to assess the
particular proceedings, but it does now include a new discretionary
exception to recognition that permits judges to consider whether the
433. Id. (citing Ashenden, 233 F.3d at 477).
434. See id. § 5(a)(ii).
435. Id.
436. Id. § 5 cmt. d.
437. Id. § 5(a).
438. See supra notes 376-78 and accompanying text.
439. See supra note 32.
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individual proceedings were compatible with due process.44 °
Specifically, this new exception provides that a state need not
recognize a foreign judgment if "the specific proceeding in the
foreign court leading to the [foreign-country] judgment was not
compatible with the requirements of due process of law." '441 The
commentary states the following about the distinction between the
international due process provision and this new provision:
[T]he difference is that between showing, for example, that there
has been such a breakdown of law and order in the particular
foreign country that judgments are rendered on the basis of
political decisions rather than the rule of law throughout the
judicial system versus a showing that for political reasons the
particular party against whom the foreign-country judgment
was entered was denied fundamental fairness in the particular
proceedings leading to the foreign-country judgment.442
Also, like the ALI's draft statute, the NCCUSL's Revised Uniform
Act contains an exception that deals with corruption of the foreign
court.443 The exception is almost identical to the corruption excep-
tion in the ALI's draft.444 The commentary states the following about
both of the new discretionary exceptions:
[B]oth are discretionary grounds for denying recognition,
while [the international due process provision] is mandatory.
Obviously, if the entire judicial system in the foreign country
fails to satisfy the requirements of impartiality and fundamental
fairness, a judgment rendered in that foreign country would be
so compromised that the forum court should refuse to recognize
it as a matter of course. On the other hand, if the problem is
evidence of a lack of integrity or fundamental fairness with
regard to the particular proceeding leading to the foreign-
country judgment, then there may or may not be other factors in
440. See UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(8)
(2005). NCCUSL adopted the new version of the Act in July 2005. No state has adopted it at
this point. See supra note 32.
441. UNiFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(8) (2005).
442. Id. § 4 cmt. 12.
443. Id. § 4(c)(7).
444. See supra text accompanying notes 433-35.
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the particular case that would cause the forum court to decide to
recognize the foreign-country judgment.445
At this time no state has adopted the Revised Uniform Act.44' These
new exceptions in the Revised Uniform Act are certainly important
steps in the right direction. If approved and later adopted by the
thirty states that have enacted the original Uniform Act, they will
provide a much needed defense for judgment debtors who never had
an opportunity for a full and fair hearing in the foreign proceedings.
The exceptions, however, are insufficient. The international due
process provision remains a mandatory provision in the Uniform
Act." 7 Courts will continue judging other countries' legal systems,
and the perceived fairness of the overall system will be a far more
dominant factor than what happened in the individual proceed-
ings-indeed it will likely be the only factor.
C. Exporting the Constitution?
In the free speech arena, it has been argued that applying
American constitutional norms to foreign judgments constitutes a
normatively undesirable exportation of the Constitution. 44' There
have been cases in which courts have refused to recognize foreign
judgments because to do so would be in violation of the free speech
guarantees of the Constitution. 449 The courts in those cases have
applied the state action doctrine, as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Shelley v. Kraemer.45 ° Shelley established that judicial
enforcement can sometimes constitute state action amounting to a
constitutional violation.451 One scholar, criticizing courts' reliance on
Shelley, argued that the case was anomalous because the Court had
not extended Shelley to the area of private contract enforcement; he
445. UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRYMONEYJUDGMENTSRECOGNITIONACT § 4 cmt. 12 (2005).
446. See supra note 32.
447. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
448. See Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 173 (2004)
[hereinafter Rosen, Exporting]; Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American" Foreign Judgments
Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REv. 783, 785-87 (2004) [hereinafter Rosen, "Un-American"].
449. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing cases in which U.S. courts refused to enforce foreign
judgments because of First Amendment concerns).
450. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
451. Id. at 13-14.
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then analogized foreign judgments to private contracts.452 This
Part discusses the free speech cases and then argues that the courts
are correct to find that Shelley v. Kraemer precludes them from
enforcing unconstitutional foreign judgments. Courts should also
apply the state action analysis in due process cases. Whether a
foreign judgment would be in violation of either free speech or due
process rights, courts cannot recognize them. While the state action
analysis provides additional support for my proposal that courts
analyze the particular proceedings in foreign courts to determine
whether there was procedural due process, it also demonstrates that
there must be a substantive component to the international due
process inquiry.
1. The Free Speech Cases
In Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc., a case of first
impression, the New York Supreme Court refused to recognize and
enforce a British libel judgment because the judgment violated the
First Amendment.4" The judgment, which held a news story to be
defamatory, originated from the High Court of Justice in London,
England.454 The jury in the British proceedings awarded the plaintiff
£40,000, and the plaintiff sought to enforce the judgment in New
York.455 The defendant argued that the recognition of the judgment
would be in violation of the public policy of New York.45" The public
policy exception is a discretionary ground for nonrecognition under
New York's version of the Uniform Act.4 57 The plaintiff argued that
the court could "exercise its discretion to recognize the judgment,"
but the court stated that it was "doubtful whether this court has
discretion to enforce the judgment if the action in which it was
rendered failed to comport with the constitutional standards for
adjudicating libel claims."45 According to the court:
452. See Rosen, Exporting, supra note 448, at 198-99, 206-09.
453. See 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
454. Id.
455. Id. at 662.
456. Id.
457. See id.
458. Id.
2007] 1237
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
[I]f, as claimed by defendant, the public policy to which the
foreign judgment is repugnant is embodied in the First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution or the free speech
guaranty of the Constitution of this State, the refusal to
recognize the judgment should be, and it is deemed to be,
"constitutionally mandatory."4 "9
In the United Kingdom, the defendant has the burden of proving
the truth of a statement and establishing that he is entitled to a
"qualified privilege for newspaper publications and broadcasters."'
Interestingly, that privilege will not be granted if the defendant
refused to publish an explanation or contradiction provided by the
plaintiff.4"' The Bachchan court refused to recognize the judgment
because of the differences between British and American standards
for libel suits by private persons against the media.46 2 The court
noted that "[p]lacing the burden of proving truth upon media
defendants who publish speech of public concern has been held
unconstitutional [by the U.S. Supreme Court] because fear of
liability may deter such speech.""4 6 The court held, therefore, that
the judgment was unenforceable.4 64 In doing so, the court stated:
It is true that England and the United States share many
common law principles of law. Nevertheless, a significant
difference between the two jurisdictions lies in England's lack of
an equivalent to the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The protection to free speech and the press
embodied in that amendment would be seriously jeopardized by
the entry of foreign libel judgments granted pursuant to
standards deemed appropriate in England but considered
anithetical to the protections afforded the press by the U.S.
Constitution."'
459. Id. (emphasis added).
460. Id. at 663.
461. Id. at 663 n.1.
462. Id. at 665.
463. Id. at 664.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 665.
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Similarly, the district court for the District of Columbia refused
to recognize and enforce a British libel judgment.466 In Matusevitch
v. Telnikoff, the plaintiff brought an action to preclude enforcement
of the libel judgment.467 The court found that the recognition of a
judgment rendered under "libel standards that are contrary to U.S.
libel standards would be repugnant to the public policies of the
State of Maryland and the United States." '468 The court, therefore,
refused to recognize the judgment.469 Quoting Hilton, the court
stated that comity "forbids [recognition] where such a recognition
works a direct violation of the policy of our laws, and does violence
to what we deem the rights of our citizens.""47
Following the lead of the courts in Bachchan and Matusevitch, the
Northern District of California in Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le
Racisme et LAntisemitisme47' declared a French judgment that
required internet company Yahoo! to block its users' access to Nazi
material unenforceable in the United States because it was
antithetical to the First Amendment.472 A divided panel of the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction." The Ninth Circuit then granted
rehearing en banc and recently dismissed the case in a deeply
divided opinion.474 A majority of the court agreed that there was
personal jurisdiction, but this was all that they could agree on."'
Yahoo! did not appeal the district court's First Amendment
ruling, but some of the judges discussed it anyway.476 A three-judge
plurality seemed to imply in dictum that it might be possible to
enforce foreign judgments that would be unconstitutional if
decided by a U.S. court.477 But five of the judges found this dictum
466. Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 5-36 (D.D.C. 1995).
467. Id. at 1-3.
468. Id. at 4.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 3 (alteration in original) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)).
471. 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
472. Id. at 1194.
473. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1126
(9th Cir. 2004).
474. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1201
(9th Cir. 2006).
475. See id.
476. See id. at 1239-41 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
477. See id. at 1215 (opinion of Fletcher, Schroeder, & Gould, JJ.) ("Inconsistency with
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"troubling.''4R They found no reason why "courts would refuse [in
some cases] to enforce a foreign judgment that violated a state
statute [based on the public policy exception], yet be willing to
enforce a foreign judgment that violates the ... Constitution. 479
According to these five judges, courts are
to honor foreign judgments unless they "prejudice the rights of
United States citizens or violate domestic public policy." The
French orders on their face-and by putting Yahoo! at risk of
substantial penalties-violate the First Amendment and are
plainly contrary to one of America's, and by extension Califor-
nia's, most cherished public policies. 4'
2. The Applicability of Shelly v. Kraemer and the Uniqueness of
Foreign Judgments
The First Amendment cases relied on the state action doctrine
established in the much celebrated case of Shelley v. Kraemer.81
There, the U.S. Supreme Court found that state courts' enforcement
of racially discriminatory restrictive covenants violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.482 The Court found
a constitutional violation even though, standing alone, the cove-
nants did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the covenants
were not created through "state action. '48" But the Court found that
judicial enforcement of the discriminatory covenants constituted the
necessary state action.48 4 Shelley established that judicial enforce-
ment can constitute "state action" amounting to a constitutional
violation under certain circumstances.
Aside from the First Amendment cases, there is essentially no
case law applying the state action doctrine in the foreign judg-
ment context. While invoking Shelley, the courts in the First
American law is not necessarily enough to prevent recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment in the United States.").
478. Id. at 1240 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
479. Id.
480. Id. at 1239 (citations omitted).
481. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
482. Id. at 20.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 19 ("We have no doubt that there has been state action in these cases in the full
and complete sense of the phrase.").
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Amendment/foreign judgment cases have offered little analysis of
their extension of Shelley and the state action doctrine to the area
of foreign judgment recognition. For example, in Yahoo!, the district
court simply stated that "[t]he French order prohibits the sale or
display of items based on their association with a particular political
organization and bans the display of websites based on the authors'
viewpoint with respect to the Holocaust and anti-Semitism. A
United States court constitutionally could not make such an
order."4 5 In other words, the court could not itself have ordered
Yahoo! to block its users' access to Nazi material, and therefore, it
was not at liberty to put its stamp of approval on a French order
that did so.
Some scholars have criticized courts' reliance on Shelley and the
state action doctrine in the First Amendment/foreign judgment
cases.4"6 Shelley was a controversial decision because conceivably,
under its theory of state action, all decisions by state courts are
state action and private actions are all subject to constitutional
scrutiny.8 ' In fact, the Supreme Court has limited Shelley's reach
in cases involving private contracts outside of the racial discrimina-
tion context.88 But the Court has conspicuously avoided discussing
Shelley in those cases. Scholars criticizing courts' reliance on Shelley
in the foreign judgment context analogize foreign judgments to
private contracts, arguing that they should be treated the same with
respect to the state action doctrine.4 9 If they are treated as private
contracts, then judgments like the French judgment in Yahoo!
should be enforced because post-Shelley case law has limited the
application of the state action doctrine in the private contract
area.
490
485. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181,
1189 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
486. See, e.g., Rosen, Exporting, supra note 448 (arguing that Shelley does not apply to
foreign judgment recognition and that U.S. courts can enforce judgments that would be
antithetical to the Constitution); Rosen, "Un-American," supra note 448 (arguing that U.S.
courts can enforce foreign judgments that would violate the Constitution, but noting that the
decision to do so is a matter of policy best suited for the political branches).
487. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 506-07 (2d ed.
2002).
488. Id. at 507-10.
489. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Exporting, supra note 448, at 206-09.
490. Id.
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It is true that Shelley was anomalous, and it does not help that
the Supreme Court has not provided much guidance on the applica-
tion of Shelley's principles. But foreign judgments also stand as
unique creatures in the American judicial system. In fact, it is the
uniqueness of these judgments that has prompted so much dis-
course as to how best to deal with them in the hundred-plus years
following Hilton, and even prior to Hilton.49 1 Foreign judgments
are readily distinguishable from private contractual rights. First,
parties freely and voluntarily enter into private contracts. A foreign
judgment is usually obtained after litigation in which the judgment
debtor defended unsuccessfully against the claims of the judgment
creditor. Under most circumstances, the judgment debtor can hardly
be said to have voluntarily agreed to the terms of the foreign
judgment. Subsequent limitations on Shelley in private contract
cases, therefore, really do not shed much light on the applicability
of the state action doctrine to foreign judgments.
Moreover, when an American court recognizes a foreign judg-
ment, the judgment effectively becomes an American judgment,
subject to the same full faith and credit in state and federal courts
as any judgment obtained within the United States. This elevation
of judgments that otherwise are meaningless and without effect
outside of the rendering country, has always given pause to their
enforcement in this country. Indeed, the hesitation with respect to
foreign judgments has been present since Hilton and even before
that case, when scholars outside the United States, like Ulrich
Huber, pondered over the effect such judgments should receive
outside of the rendering country.492
Huber, a seventeenth century Dutch scholar, has been credited
with formulating the idea of comity, which ultimately inspired U.S.
jurists in conceiving U.S. conflicts principles generally, and foreign
judgment recognition law in particular.493 Huber sought to reconcile
the theory of national sovereignty with the needs of a burgeoning
global trading system.494 He wrote a treatise on private interna-
491. See Miller, supra note 339, at 241-49 (noting the complexity of foreign judgment
recognition law before and after Hilton).
492. D.J. Llewelyn Davies, The Influence of Huber's De Conflictu Legum on English Private
International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, 56-57 (1937).
493. See Paul, supra note 24, at 14-15.
494. See id.
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tional law, entitled De Conflictu Legum, in which he stated three
principles regarding the operation of foreign law within a sover-
eign's territory. 495 The first was that "[t]he laws of every sovereign
authority have force within the boundaries of its state, and bind all
subject to it, but not beyond. 496 Second, Huber thought that every
person found within the limits of a government's territory was
deemed a subject of that government. 497 And third, Huber believed
that "[tihose who exercise sovereign authority so act from comity,
that the laws of every nation having been applied within its own
boundaries should retain their effect everywhere so far as they
do not prejudice the powers or rights of another state, or its sub-
jects. 498 So, the recognition of a foreign judgment is based on a
country's voluntary decision, out of comity concerns: "Although such
international courtesy may warrant judicial restraint ... it does not
obligate a country to waive its basic constitutional principles.' 4
In his famous Commentaries on Conflicts of Law, Justice Story
relied on Huber's three axioms and the comity doctrine to explain
the recognition of foreign judgments.5"' Like Huber, Justice Story
was always concerned about the interests of the enforcing state, as
well as the interests of the individual litigants, particularly U.S.
citizens.501 In fact, during the first half of the nineteenth century,
495. Id. at 15.
496. Davies, supra note 492, at 56.
497. Id. at 57.
498. Id.
499. Ayelet Ben-Ezer & Ariel L. Bendor, Conceptualizing Yahoo! v. L.C.R.A.: Private Law,
Constitutional Review, and International Conflict of Laws, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2133
(2004).
500. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 30, 37 (1934). British jurist
Lord Mansfield, who was born a Scot and studied Scottish law, was also influenced by Huber.
He drew on Huber's work as a source for resolving conflicts of law issues. Mansfield wanted
to facilitate international trade and saw the doctrine of comity as a way to do so. He did not,
however, want to sacrifice the public policy of Great Britain. For example, slavery was against
the public policy of Britain, and British courts would not apply the proslavery laws of other
countries, like the United States. Thus, Mansfield did not view comity as obligating deference
to the foreign state. Paul, supra note 24, at 17-19.
501. Justice Story's interpretation of Huber's maxims focused on the international
ramifications of choice-of-law assessments. Story's theory of conflicts was concerned with
maintaining amicable relationships with foreign nations; thus, he stressed the importance of
extending courtesy to other nations and recognizing their interests. His theory was also
concerned with the enforcing forum's interest in making choice-of-law decisions that would
promote the development of an effective international system that supported global commerce.
Still, Justice Story was concerned with the interests of individual litigants. His theory of
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U.S. courts treated foreign judgments as prima facie evidence of a
claim, as did British courts. Hilton established the comity-based
guidelines for judgment recognition, but even in Hilton, the Court
was concerned with individual rights. Recall that the Court in
Hilton said that comity
is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws."'2
Moreover, the first guideline that the Court announced regarding
foreign judgment recognition was that there was an "opportunity for
a full and fair trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdic-
tion."° 3
There has always been a concern for the integrity of a judgment
and the proceedings that resulted in the judgment. The Hilton
court contemplated that a judgment that would violate the U.S.
Constitution would not be enforceable. Indeed, shortly after Hilton,
the Texas Supreme Court refused to recognize a Mexican judgment
because the Mexican court did not afford the judgment debtor a full
and fair opportunity to present its defenses; in other words, the
court denied the judgment debtor due process." 4
3. Substantive International Due Process
The free speech cases and their reliance on the state action
doctrine are instructive in the due process arena. Courts are not at
liberty to ignore the particular proceedings that took place in the
foreign courts in favor of an overall assessment of the judicial
system. That is, they are not at liberty to ignore procedural due
process violations in the foreign court. The free speech cases,
moreover, are instructive on the substantive due process issue that
comity, therefore, contained both political and principled legal components. Harold G. Maier,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private
International Law, 76 AM. J. INVL L. 280, 283-85 (1982).
502. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (emphasis added).
503. Id. at 202.
504. See supra note 191.
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the Seventh Circuit raised in Ashenden. Of course, Ashenden
established that international due process is limited to an inquiry
into the procedural fairness of the overall judicial system in the
country at issue. Recall, however, that the court suggested that the
Names would have had a viable substantive due process claim,
stemming from the conclusive evidence clause, if they had not
abandoned their objection to the foreign judgment based on the
public policy exception to the Uniform Act.5"5 Specifically, the
court found that the conclusive evidence clause did not merely
"postpone" the Names' objections to the premium assessments, but
it "extinguishe[d]" their right to cure errors in the assessment
except those that were "manifest."506 This extinguishing of their
rights gave rise to a substantive, not a procedural, due process
claim. Judge Posner, however, seriously doubted that international
due process had room for a substantive component.
The underlying principle in the free speech cases-that courts are
not at liberty to enforce judgments that would violate the U.S.
Constitution-dictates otherwise. In those cases, the courts were
presented with foreign judgments based on substantive rules that
were contrary to American constitutional standards. The Shelley
rule establishes that these judgments are unenforceable. Likewise,
if a judgment debtor demonstrates that the substantive rule on
which his judgment is based violates substantive due process, under
U.S. constitutional standards, then Shelley precludes the enforce-
ment of that judgment as well. Shelley and the free speech cases
that rely on its principles, therefore, demonstrate that there must
indeed be a substantive aspect to the due process analysis of foreign
judgments. The court in Ashenden ignored the state action problem
because of its fixation on internationalizing due process by watering
it down to make the British judgments enforceable. Courts,
however, cannot constitutionally lower the requirements of due
process out of "respect" for other countries.
As two scholars recently stated in a coauthored article regarding
the constitutional review and international conflict of laws, "a court
adjudicating a claim lacks the institutional authority simply to
derogate its governing constitution when treating questions of
505. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
506. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 2000).
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private law."5 7 This is because "the Constitution expresses the
fundamental political, social and moral principles of the United
States.""5 Enforcing foreign judgments that conflict with the
Constitution would go against the fundamental principles of the
forum court.50 9 After all, how can we justify having a system in
which the domestic constitution is supreme over all non-constitu-
tional domestic laws and norms, "but is suddenly shorn of its
effectiveness when confronted by non-constitutional foreign laws?" 10
CONCLUSION
As courts continue to face unprecedented globalization, they must
be vigilant in upholding their responsibilities to domestic law. They
must safeguard the most fundamental principles that formed the
foundation of the U.S. government, which include the separation of
powers and the protection of the individual rights embodied in the
Constitution. Any conception of due process that requires courts to
engage in foreign policymaking fails at these most fundamental
levels. Thus, when faced with a due process challenge to a judgment
from the court of another country, U.S. courts should consider not
the entire judicial system, but the particular proceedings that
produced the judgment. Perhaps judges will then find justice in
what they thought were some of the most unlikely places, and
injustice where they least expected it.
507. Ben-Ezer & Bendor, supra note 499, at 2132.
508. Id. at 2133.
509. Id.
510. Id.
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